An adopted child should be considered a member of the family and entitled to the same benefits as a natural-born child for the purpose of compassionate appointment under the Dying in Harness Rules.

JUDGMENT

Lok Pal Singh, J. - By means of present writ petition, petitioner has sought the following reliefs:-

(i) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the order dated 23.03.2010 (annexure no.1 to this writ petition) passed by respondent no.1.

(ii) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents to appoint the petitioner under dying in harness for decease.

(iii) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents to change the Dying in Harness Rules, 1974 in family members list.

(iv) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents to compliance the order passed by this Hon'ble Court vide order dated 07.11.2018.

(v) Issue any suitable order or direction as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the circumstance of the case.

(vi) Award the cost of the writ petition to the petitioner.

2. Factual matrix of the case is that the petitioner is the adopted son of Late Shri Shyam Singh, who was working as regular Baildwar in the establishment of the Public Works Department, Narendranagar and died while in service on 29.01.2007. After his father's death, the petitioner, being the only son, moved an application before the authority concerned on 23.04.2007 seeking appointment on compassionate grounds. Said application was rejected by the Secretary, Government of Uttarakhand, vide letter dated 23.10.2010, stating that under the provisions of Uttarakhand U.P. Recruitment of Dependents of Government Servants Dying in Harness Rules, 1974 and Uttaranchal (the Uttar Pradesh Recruitment of Dependents of Government Servant Dying in Harness Rules, 1974) Adaptation and Amendment Order 2002 and First Amendment 2004 adopted by State of Uttarakhand, the adopted son does not fall within the ambit of the dependent of Government Servant and as such the petitioner being the adopted son cannot be provided compassionate appointment.

3. It is stated that for providing financial help to the family member of the deceased government employee under the Uttar Pradesh Grants Fund, husband/wife, legal son, step son or daughter, father, mother are defined as family. Further, for the purpose of getting family pension, family is defined as: (1) husband/wife (2) minor son (3) unmarried minor daughters and (4) legally adopted child before the retirement of deceased employee, whereas for providing appointment on compassionate grounds in view of Dying in Harness Rules, wife/husband, son, unmarried daughter or widow daughter, unmarried son, unmarried sister or widow mother (in the case of deceased employee being unmarried), has been defined as family/dependent. The grievance of the petitioner is that being the adopted son he cannot be discriminated by the respondent for the purpose of providing appointment on compassionate ground.

4. Counter affidavit has been filed by respondent no.3 stating that in compliance of this Court's order dated 07.11.2008 the case of the petitioner was considered for compassionate appointment and the same was rejected by the Secretary, Government of Uttarakhand vide order dated 23.3.2010 as the adopted son is not defined in the Uttaranchal (the Uttar Pradesh Recruitment of Dependents of Government Servant Dying in Harness Rules, 1974) Adaptation and Amendment Order 2002 and First Amendment 2004 (hereinafter to be referred as the Dying in Harness Rules).

5. Rejoinder affidavit has been filed to the counter affidavit of respondent no.3 wherein it is stated that on 30.06.2004 an adoption deed was executed by father of the petitioner. In that adoption deed it is categorically stated that Shri Shyam Singh and his wife i.e. Guddu Devi have adopted one son before 20 years ago with their own will and with the whole Hindu customs and ceremonies of adoption. It is also stated that the order dated 23.03.2010 mentioned for the purpose of refusing the claim of the petitioner does not hold ground for the simple reason that th