The main legal point established in the judgment is the interpretation and application of the provisions of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, including the maintainability of complaints, jurisdiction of the court, and the principles of double jeopardy.

JUDGMENT :

RAVINDRA MAITHANI, J.

1. The challenge in this petition is made to the proceedings of Complaint Case No. 3 of 2022, Directorate of Enforcement, Govt. of India vs. M/s Luxmi Auto Industries (through its partners Satish Kumar Gupta and Parminder Singh) and Others, under Section 3 read with 70 and 4 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (for short “the Act”), pending before the court of Special Judge (PMLA)/District and Sessions Judge, Dehradun (for short “the case”).

2. Facts necessary to appreciate the controversy briefly stated are as follows. According to the case, the petitioners being partners of M/S Luxmi Auto Industries, B-2 Industrial Estate, Ramnagar, Roorkee, District Haridwar forged certain documents, cheated the Central Bank of India (for short “the Bank”) and obtained a loan of Rs. 1.71 Crores. According to the case, various documents were fabricated and falsely prepared by the petitioners. It was done with the conspiracy of the bank officials. An FIR was filed by the CBI on 23.07.2009, in which, after investigation, a charge-sheet has already been submitted. In the year 2022, a complaint under the Act has been filed against the petitioners and others which is basis of the case. In this complaint, on 30.03.2022 cognizance has been taken against the petitioners and others. These proceedings are questioned in this petition.

3. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

4. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners would submit that proceeding of the case cannot continue under law. It is argued that with regard to the loan, a claim was made by the bank before the Debt Recovery Tribunal (for short “DRT”), which was allowed. But, during execution proceedings, the matter was settled and the due amount was paid by the petitioners to the Bank.

5. It is argued that long thereafter, the complaint has been filed under the Act. Learned counsel also raised the following points in his arguments:

(i) The provisions of the Act are not attracted in this case because the loan has already been paid.

(ii) The proceedings of the case cannot be simultaneously taken against a person, it is barred by virtue of Section 26 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (for short “General Clauses Act”), Section 300 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short “the Code”) and Article 20 Sub-Clause (2) of the Constitution of India.

(iii) The proceedings are time barred in view of Section 468 of the Code.

(iv) The department proceeded against the petitioners under Section 5 of the Act in a court in Ludhiana, Punjab and now, proceedings under Section 3 and 4 of the Act has been initiated in the court at Dehradun, which has no jurisdiction.

(v) Since, petitioners have already repaid the loan, nothing survives in the matter in view of Section 3(ii) of the Act.

(vi) Summoning has been done without inquiry under Sections 200 and 202 of the Code.

6. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance on the principle of law, as laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of K. Virupaksha and Another vs. State of Karnataka and Another, AIR 2020 SC 3648.

7. In the case of K. Virupaksha (supra), a person, who obtained loan defaulted in its payment. Proceedings were initiated before the DRT, which were dismissed. Thereafter, a complaint was filed, which was ordered to be investigated for the offences punishable under Sections 511, 109, 34, 120-B, 406, 409, 420, 405, 417 and 426 IPC. The Hon’ble Court observed “the petitioners after dismissal of the application before the DRT filed the impugned complaint which appears to be an intimidatory tactic and the afterthought, which is an abuse of process of law.”

8. Hon’ble Supreme Court while allowing the petition in the case of K. Virupaksha “in a circumstance, where we have already indicated that a criminal proceeding would not be sustainable in a matter of the present nature, exposing the appellants even on that count to the proceedings before the i