The court emphasized the need for a logical and sound foundation in determining compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act, considering the implications of Schedule 2 and Sections 163 and 163A.

JUDGMENT :

Facts, apparent from the records are:

(i) That on 9th February, 2015, a claim petition was filed by the claimants, invoking the provisions contained under Section 166 to be read with Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act,

(ii) The claim petition, thus filed under the aforesaid provisions for grant of the compensation, was on account of the death of Km. Shagun, who met with an Accident with the bus bearing registration No. PB08AP-9080, and as a consequence of the allegation of negligence, which has been contended by the claimants factually that while Km. Shagun was boarding the bus, it was being negligently driven by the driver of the offending vehicle, resulting into her death and at the time of her death, she was of 5 years of age.

2. The fact of accident and the death are not the disputed facts. For the purpose of determining an adequacy of the compensation, to be made payable in relation to these peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case where the deceased was of 5 years of age, which is a fact, not disputed by any of the parties, which would be the parameters that has to be adopted for the purposes of determining the compensation.

3. The accident had chanced on 9th February 2015. At that point of time, the provisions of Schedule 2, of the Motor Vehicles Act, was applicable, as it is then existed under the statute and as per the schedule given therein, as per its Entry 1, in case of the death of a person upto 15 years of age, the multiplier of ‘15’ was contemplated to be made applicable, in relation to those cases, which were falling within the ambit of Section 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act.

4. To controvert the arguments extended by the learned counsel for the appellant, firstly, the learned counsel for the respondent submits that the implications of the Schedule 2 will not be applicable for the reason being that the case itself would not fall within the ambit of Section163A of the Act and the issue as to whether it will fall under Section163 or 163A, has never been an issue, which was ever argued or attempted to be argued before the learned Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal.

5. Secondly, it is argued by the learned counsel for the appellant, that the aspects of determination of notional income as per schedule 2, as provided in its clause 6, where in the cases of fatal accident or in the case of disability in a non fatal accident, there are two clauses, which have been defined therein, i.e. “in relation to the non earning person”, and “spouses”.

6. The present case would fall under sub Clause (a) of clause 6 of Schedule 2, i.e. non earning, where the notional income has been observed, as to be made payable as Rs. 15000/- per annum.

7. In the case at hand, when the matter was being considered by the learned Motor Accidents claims Tribunal, while determining the compensation under Section 166A, in fact, it has been argued by the learned counsel for the respondent Insurance Company, as well as the learned counsel for the owner of the vehicle, that the determination of compensation as prayed for under Section 166, its determination cannot be extended to be brought within the determination of compensation, as under Section 166A.

8. The learned Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, on exchange of the pleadings, particularly, the proceedings, when it was objected by the Insurance Company, by way of filing a written statement i.e. paper number 25(ka/1) and the owner of the vehicle, by filing a written statement i.e. paper number 28 (kha), the learned Motor Accidents claim Tribunal, had framed certain issues, but none of the issues relate to consideration of as to whether the applicability of Section 163A and Section 163 of the Act, would be attracted in the facts and circumstances of the instant case, nor the aspects pertaining to the quantification of the damages claimed under the petition under Section 166 was attempted to be argued by any of the parties to be falling within or outside the ambit of Section 163A of the Act