An order passed under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act may be challenged under Section 17, and the petitioner has an alternate efficacious remedy under Section 17.

JUDGMENT :

The challenge in this petition is made to the order dated 24.04.2023, passed by respondent no.1, the District Magistrate, Haridwar under Section 14 of The Securitisation And Reconstruction Of Financial Assets And Enforcement Of Security Interest Act, 2002 (“SARFAESI Act”) as well as the possession notice dated 27.04.2023, issued by the respondent no.3, the Canara Bank, Roorkee.

2. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the petitioner had taken loan which has to be repaid till the year 2025; the petitioner did not default in the payment of any installment; his account has wrongly been declared as NPA and it is submitted that the petitioner made a representation that has yet not been decided by the respondent no.3. Therefore, directions are sought.

4. The order dated 24.04.2023 that has been passed by the District Magistrate, Haridwar is an order passed under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act. What is being argued impliedly is that the provisions of Section 13 of the SARFAESI Act, has not been done before the impugned orders were passed. The SARFAESI Act has been enacted with a purpose.

5. In the case of Harshad Govardhan Sondagar Vs. International Assets Reconstruction Company Limited and Others, (2014) 6 SCC 1, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that, “the decision of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or the District Magistrate can be challenged before the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution by any aggrieved party and if such a challenge is made, the High Court can examine the decision of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or the District Magistrate, as the case may be, in accordance with the settled principles of law.”

6. The principle of law as laid down in the case of Harshad Govardhan Sondagar (supra) has been discussed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of C. Bright vs. District Collector and others, (2021)2 SCC 392 and the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that:-

“19. Harshad Govardhan Sondagar Harshad Govardhan Sondagar v. International Assets Reconstruction Co. Ltd., (2014) 6 SCC 1 : (2014) 3 SCC (Civ) 1 was a case where the person in possession claimed tenancy rights in the premises as well as a protected tenancy, being a tenant prior to creation of a mortgage. It was held that the remedy of an aggrieved person against a decision of Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or a District Magistrate lay only before the High Court. However, after the aforesaid judgment was rendered on 3-4- 2014, the Act had been amended and subsection (4-A) was inserted in Section 17 with effect from 1-9-2016. This provided a right to move an application to the Debts Recovery Tribunal by a person who claimed tenancy or leasehold rights.”

7. Not only this, in the case of Kotak Mahindra Bank Limited. Vs. Girnar Corrugators Private Limited and Others, (2023) 3 SCC 210, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has categorically held that, in fact, an order passed under Section 14 may also be challenged under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act. In para 34 of the judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as hereunder:-

“34. Under Section 14 of the Sarfaesi Act, the District Magistrate or the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate as the case may be is required to assist the secured creditor in getting the possession of the secured assets. Under Section 14 of the Sarfaesi Act, neither the District Magistrate nor the Metropolitan Magistrate would have any jurisdiction to adjudicate and/or decide the dispute even between the secured creditor and the debtor. If any person is aggrieved by the steps under Section 13(4)/order passed under Section 14, then the aggrieved person has to approach the Debts Recovery Tribunal by way of appeal/application under Section 17 of the Sarfaesi Act.”

8. The petitioner has an alternate efficacious remedy to ventilate his grievance under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act. Therefore, this Court is of the view that the instant petition may not be entertained. Ac