M. HIDAYATULLAH, C. J.

( 1 ) THIS appeal is by the defendants, one of whom Tilakchand died during the pendency of the civil suit and only three of the original defendants are now left. Of these, the first appellant Janku was the widow of Laxman, and she transferred 7. 39 acres out of khasra No. 343/1 (left by her husband Laxman) to the other defendants by a registered sale deed dated 28 March, 1951. This transaction was challenged by the plaintiff-respondent successfully in the Court below, and he obtained a declaration that the transfer was not binding on him after the death of mst. Janku. The present appeal is filed against that decision.

( 2 ) IT may be pointed put that the learned counsel for the appellant did not challenge the decision on the ground that legal necessity had been established in the case. The findings, therefore, on the subject of legal necessity, consideration, and the genuineness of the transaction remain unaffected. The appellants have stated their case entirely under the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (Act 30 of 1956), and particularly Chapter III of that Act. A decision of a Full bench of this Court reported in Mst. Lukai v. Niranjan, 1958 MPLJ 244 : (AIR 1958 mp 160) (A), governs the case. The learned counsel for the appellants requested us to reconsider the matter in view of the decisions of the Allahabad and the Patna High Courts reported in hanuman B. Prasad v. Indrawati, AIR 1958 All 304 (B) and Ramsaroop v. Hiralal air 1958 Pat 319 (C), respectively and the cases relied upon by the Division benches in those cases. I do not think that we should refer the matter for further consideration because the view of this Court is supported by a number of decisions of High Courts in India which have been cited in the Full Bench case. However, I consider it necessary to state why the view of these two High Courts is not acceptable to me.

( 3 ) IN so far as the Allahnbnd case is concerned, the Division Bench there accepted the proposition that Section 14 of the Act is not retrospective in every way. According to the learned Judges, the provisions are retrospective only if the widow continued to hold the property on the date the Act came into force and they are prospective in respect of property acquired by the widow subsequent to the Act. The learned Judges interpreted Section 14 in the same way as the Full Bench. They stated that if a widow had alienated the property without legal necessity and the alienation was invalid according to Hindu Law, it remained invalid and its invalidity was not affected at all by the provisions of Section 14. They, however, held further that since the reversioners as a class had disappeared, a declaratory decree obtained by a reversioner before the Act came into force could not be maintained in appeal after the Act came into force because the declaration that the alienation would not be binding on him on the death of the widow was rendered futile by the Act.

( 4 ) IN the Patna case the learned Judges took a different view of Section 14 and interpreted the word 'possessed' as implying past or present or future possession. They, therefore, held that the section was retrospective to the fullest extent and increased the rights of the Hindu widow retrospectively.

( 5 ) I do not agree -- and I say it respectfully --with the interpretation placed by the Patna High Court upon the word 'possessed' in Section 14. It tends to make the section read as follows : 'any property of a female Hindu, whether possessed or not, but acquired before or after the commencement of the Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner'. It is obvious enough that the section does not have such a meaning. The section reads : 'any property possessed by a female Hindu,. . . . . shall be held by her as full owner thereof. . . This shows that to attract the provision bettering her rights therein the property must have been possessed by the widow when the Act came into force

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