An order of an inferior authority functioning under an Act cannot be said to merge in the order of an administrative tribunal exercising quasi-judicial functions passed in an appeal or a revision.

( 1 ) THIS is a Letters Patent appeal from an order, of Naik J. dismissing an application filed by the appellant under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India challenging the validity of a demand made on him under Rule 9 (2) of the Central Excise Rules for payment of Rs. 1437/15/- as excise duty on about 20 tins of vegetable non-essential oils said to have been cleared by the appellant in the month of March 1956.

( 2 ) THE excise duty was imposed on 2-5-1956 by the Inspector, Central Excise, in charge of Oil Mills at Raipur under the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944, and the Rules made thereunder. It seems that after the levy of the duty when the appellant protested against it he was advised by the Assistant Collector, Central Excise, Jabalpur, to pay up the amount and appeal to the Collector, Central Excise, Nagpur. Thereafter when the appellant preferred an appeal he was again asked to pay the amount of the duty and informed that his appeal would be considered only after the payment of the amount. The appellant says that he made a 'representation' to the Central Government against the imposition of the duty. On this representation the Government of India in the Ministry of Finance passed the following order on 31st October 1957:

"the Government of India have carefully considered all the points made by the applicant, but they regret that they do not see any justification for interfering with the Order in appeal. The revision application is, therefore, rejected".

The appellant then moved this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. The learned Single Judge held that in view of the Full Bench decision of this Court in Surajmal v. State of M. P. , AIR 1958 Madh-Pra 103 the petition was not tenable as the appellant had approached the Central Government and the order of the Inspector, Central Excise, and of the Collector in appeal had merged in the order of the Central Government; that the Central Government in this matter was outside the jurisdiction of this Court; and that as the original order could not be set aside without setting aside the order of the Central Government which was outside the jurisdiction of this Court, the petition could not be entertained by this Court.

( 3 ) SHRI Dabir, learned counsel for the appellant, conceded that if the order of the Central Government passed on 31-10-1957 were to be regarded as a final order in which the order of the Inspector. Central Excise, and of the Collector in appeal were merged, then no doubt according to the decision in Surajmal's Case, AIR 1958 Madh Pra 103 (supra) the petition was not tenable. He, however, argued that the later decisions of the Supreme Court in U. P. State v. Mohammad Nooh, AIR 1958 SC 86 and Sita Ram Goel v. Municipal Board, Kanpur, AIR 1958 SC 1036 made it clear that the analogy of the decree of the trial Court merging into the decree of the appeal Court did not apply to orders passed by administrative tribunals exercising quasi-judicial Functions and that the original order in such proceedings would remain operative on its own strength even if an appeal or a revision against the order had been dismissed. Learned counsel urged that the authority of the decision in Surajmal's Case, AIR 1958 Madh Pra 103 was considerably weakened by the two decisions of the Supreme Court mentioned earlier.

( 4 ) IN our judgment this appeal must be allowed. In Surajmal's Case, AIR 1958 Madh Pra 103' after a review of several decisions the Full Bench summarized its conclusion thus: "to begin with, if an authority sought to be bound is permanently located or normally carries on its activities elsewhere, the High Court cannot possess Jurisdiction over it even though the parties to the case reside and the cause of action arises within the High Court's jurisdiction: Election Commission, India v. Saka Venkata Subba Rao, 1 Ele - LR 417 : (AIR 1953 SC 210 ). On the contrary, if the cause of action arises elsewhere and the parties also reside outs