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1957 Supreme(SC) 103

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
30th September 1957.
S.R. DAS, C.J.I., VENKATARAMA AYYAR, IMAM, SARKAR AND BOSE, JJ.
State of U.P., Appellant
Versus
Mohammad Nooh, Respondent.
Civil Appeal No. 130 of 1956.
Advocates appeared
M/s. G. C. Mathur and C. P. Lal, Advocates, for Appellant; Mr. S. P. Sinha, Sr. Advocate, (Mr. S. D. Sekhri, Advocate, with him), for Respondent.

Advocates:
C.P.LAL, G.C.MATHUR, S.D.SEKHRI, S.P.SINHA

Headnote:WHERE INFERIOR COURT/TRIBUNAL AT FIRST INSTANCE ACTS IMPROPERLY SUPREME COURT MAY EXERCISE POWER AND ISSUE CERTIORARY WRIT AGAINST COURT AT FIRST INSTANCE EVEN THOUGH RECOURSE TO APPEAL TO ANOTHER LOWER COURT/TRIBUNAL AVAILABLE WAS NOT TAKEN OR IF TAKEN IT CONFIRMED WHAT WAS EX-FACIE A NULLITY. - RETROSPECTIVE OPERATION OF ARTICLE 226 - EXISTENCE OF ALTERNATIVE SUITABLE REMEDY TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT BY COURT IN EXERCISING DISCRETION AND DECIDING TO ISSUE WRIT - WHERE POWERS ARE GOVERNED BY TERMS OF AGREEMENT EXCLUSIVELY LIMITATIONS UNDER RULES OF NATURAL JUSTICE WOULD NOT APPLY - ALTERNATIVE REMEDY—CERTIORARI MAY ISSUE EVEN THOUGH THERE IS RIGHT TO APPEAL UNDER LAW

       -held, closed transactions of past and rights and liabilities already determined would remain unaffected.

       -held, as a rule of policy and convenience, discretion, and not as a rule of law, Superior Court will decline to interfere if the statutory remedy has not been exhausted.

       - held, there is no rule for writ of certiorari as with mandamus that it will be issued only when there is no other alternative equally effective remedy.

       -see decision in U.P. State v. Mohd. Nooh, AIR 1958 SC 86=1958 SCA 73=1958 SCJ 242=1958 SCR 595.

       

Judgement Key Points

Key Points: - The judgment discusses whether the Superior Court may issue certiorari to quash departmental orders even when an adequate statutory remedy (appeal/revision) exists. (!) (!) (!) - It addresses whether Article 226 can be applied to quash orders passed before the Constitution came into force, depending on whether finality occurred after the Constitution's commencement. (!) (!) (!) - It clarifies that certiorari is not limited to cases without any alternative remedy, and that suppression of natural justice in departmental trials can justify Extraordinary relief. (!) (!) (!) - It discusses whether orders in departmental proceedings merge and the effect on rights and remedies, including finality and retroactivity concerns. (!) (!) - It emphasizes that the presiding officer in departmental trials must maintain impartiality and that personal involvement in evidence by a presiding officer can render proceedings void. (!) (!) (!) (!) - It asserts that upon proper circumstances, the High Court may exercise writ jurisdiction to correct gross injustices even where there are other remedies, based on principles of natural justice. (!) (!)

What is the scope of the High Court's power to issue writs under Article 226 of the Constitution in the context of departmental inquiries and prior remedies?

What are the conditions under which a writ of certiorari may be issued to correct errors in inferior departmental tribunals despite available appeals or revisions?

What governs the retroactive or prospective operation of Article 226 in cases where the underlying orders were issued before the Constitution came into force?


Judgment

S. R. DAS, CJI. (with him, T. L. Venkatarama Aiyer, Syed Jafar Imam and A. K. Sarkar JJ.) ) - This is an appeal filed under a certificate of fitness granted by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad under Arts. 132 (1) and 133(1) (c) of the Constitution. It is directed against the judgment and order of a Division Bench of the said High Court pronounced on March 10, 1952, in Civil Misc. Writ no. 7376 of 1951 quashing the departmental proceedings against the respondent and the orders passed therein, namely the order for his dismissal passed by the District Superintendent of Police on December 21, 1948, the order of the Deputy Inspector General of Police passed on June 7, 1949 dismissing his appeal against the order of his dismissal and the order of the Inspector General of Police dated April 22, 1950 rejecting his application for revision. The judgment of the High Court also directed that, if it were desired to proceed against the respondent, the trial should be presided over by a person other than the District Superintendent of Police who gave evidence in the case and also passed the order of dismissal against the respondent and that it should be in strict conformity with the relevant Police Regulations.

2. The respondent was a constable in the Uttar Pradesh Police Force and was, at the material time, officiating as a Head Constable and posted in the District of Fatehpur. In December, 1947, sixty candidates had to be selected from the Police Force for training at the Police Training College, Moradabad. The respondent was sent up for selection from the District of Fatehpur. He, however, failed in the Hindi test and was not selected and sixty other candidates were selected for the training.

3. On December 8, 1947 a letter, purporting to have been issued from Lucknow, was received in the U. P. Police Head Office at Allahabad intimating that the respondent had been selected for training at the Police Training College. As there were only sixty vacancies and as sixty candidates had already been selected, the Head Office people were led to make enquiries as to how this letter came to be issued from Lucknow. The letter having been placed before the Inspector General of Police, Lucknow, he declared it to be a forgery. As the letter was ostensibly for the benefit of the respondent, it was naturally suspected that it must have been sent by or at his instance.

4. On March 15, 1948 the respondent was placed under suspension. Under S. 243 of the Government of India Act, 1935, which was then in force, the respondent, who was in the police force, was not governed by sub-s. (3) of S. 240 which corresponds to Art. 311(2) of 90 the Constitution but was governed by the Police Act, 1861 (Act V of 1861) and the Regulations made thereunder by the State Government. Accordingly, under S. 7 of the Police Act read with Uttar Pradesh Police Regulations, a departmental enquiry, called a "trial" in the Regulations, was started against the respondent. One Shri B. N. Bhalla, the then District Superintendent of Police, Fatehpur was deputed to hold the trial. He found the respondent guilty and on April 20, 1948 passed an order of dismissal against him. The respondent went up on appeal to the Deputy Inspector General of Police under Regn. 508. That appeal was dismissed on June 7, 1949. The respondent then filed a revision application to the Inspector General of Police under Regn. 512. That application was also dismissed on April 22, 1950.

5. Having exhausted all his remedies under the Police Act read with the Regulations thereunder the respondent on February 24, 1951, filed a writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution, praying that the file of the applicant (now respondent) be called for and his dismissal be set aside and that he be given such further and other relief as he may, in law, be entitled to. The main point taken in the affidavit filed in support of the petition and urged before the High Court was that Shri B. N. Bhalla, District Superinte











































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