The takeover of a temple's administration under Section 30 of the Gwalior Act is temporary and limited to restoring proper management. The Mahant, for the time being, has the right to administer the temple's property under Article 26 of the Constitution.

( 1 ) THIS case comes before me on a difference of opinion between Khan. J. and Shiv dayal, J. on the construction of Section 30 of Riyasat Gwalior Ki Paristishgabori aur Mazhabi Aukaf Ki Imdad Aur Niggrani Ka Quanoon of Samvat 1983 (hereinafter called the Gwalior Act) and the interpretation of the Durbar Order, dated 10th August 1939.

( 2 ) THE facts of the case, briefly stated, arc these. There is a temple of Kali Mata at village Basaiya in Morena district which is famous as Basaiya Mata Temple. It was established in the year 1903 by Mahant Rajpuri who, upon his death, was succeeded by his Chela Kundanpuri. On the death of Kundanpuri in 1919, his chela Tejpuri succeeded him as the Mahant, Since there were disputes between him and the Pujaris of the temple, he made on 1st July 1930 an application requesting that, as in the case of the Nagardevla Temple, the administration of the basaiya Mata Temple be taken over by the Gwalior Government. By an order, dated 1st December 1932 (Ex. P-48), the Gwalior Government (which was carried on by a Council of Regency) took over the administration under Section 30 of the gwalior Act, appointed a Special Committee as provided by that section and directed that a report showing the effect of inking over the administration of the temple be submitted after two years. After about seven years, on 10th August 1939 to be more precise, the Ruler of Gwalior passed the following operative orders: ^^bl fy;s ;g nsolfkku egur iqtkfj;ku dh gkyr [kkfrj [ckg gksus rd o eqd;ekr QSly gksus rd csglrwj ukdkq dh fuxjkuh esa jguk equkflc gksxka fygktk is'kxkg njckj ls gqde gksus ds fy;s xqjkfj'k gktk is'k gsa** when the litigation between Tejpuri and Pujaris finally ended in favour of the former, he applied to the Madhya Bharat Government that the temple be restored to him. The Government took the view that the Basaiya Mata Temple was a public temple and there was no question of restoring it to Tejpuri. Thereupon, Tejpuri brought the suit, out of which this appeal arises, claiming inter alia a declaration of his right to manage the temple and also an injunction requiring the State government to remove the control which it had been exercising over the administration of the temple, During the pendency of the suit, Tejpuri died and was succeeded by his Chela Kamalpuri.

( 3 ) THE Court of first instance decreed the plaintiff's claim. Being agrrieved, the state Government has now come up in appea ). Having regard to the facts of this case, it appears to me that the impact of the Madhya Pradesh Public Trusts Act, 1951, which was extended to the Madhya Bharat region, has not been considered. If this is a public trust as defined in Section 2 (4) of the Act, Section 32 (1) thereof enacts that no suit to enforce a right on behalf of a public trust, which has not been registered, shall be heard or decided in any Court. Secondly, the question is whether, in consequence of Section 6 (1) of the Madhya Pradesh Extension of laws Act, 1958, the Gwalior Act, being a law corresponding to the Madhya Pradesh public Trusts Act, 1951 stands repealed. Since these questions have not been referred to me, I would merely state them without expressing any opinion. ( 4 ) SHIV Dayal, J. is of the view that the Gwalior Government took over the administration of the temple only temporarily, that it did so at the instance of tejpuri and that the conduct of the parties contraindicated that Tejpuri had permanently surrendered his right of managing the temple or that the Gwalior government had permanently taken over the management. Section 30 of the gwalior Act is, according to Shiv Dayal J. , not a law of acquisition of property and it cannot justify the refusal to restore the temple to the person entitled to administer it. In regard to the Durbar Order tlated 10 August 1939, Shiv Dayal J. is of opinion that it is only an administrative order and not law. On the other hand, khan J. thinks that, since there is no provision either in Secti