( 1 ) THIS is an application under Article 226 of the Constitution for the issue of a writ of certiorari by Ramshakal Yadav, who was employed as a Rakshak in the Railway protection Force, Jabalpur, for quashing an order passed by the Assistant Security officer, Jabalpur on 6th October 1964 removing the applicant from service with effect from 8th October 1964.

( 2 ) THE petitioner's removal from service was as a sequel to a departmental enquiry held against him in May, 1964 on the charge that on the night of 15th June 1963 while detailed for duty at Post No. 9. South-Eastern Railway Platform, to guard the parcels, he helped Rakshak Govind Narayan Singh and another Rakshak Priyatam Singh in committing the theft of one bale of cloth and helped them in removing the same from the platform. The departmental enquiry was conducted by the divisional Inspector, Railway Protection Force. Jabalpur. At the conclusion of the enquiry, he found the aforesaid charge prima facie established against the petitioner and accordingly submitted his findings to the disciplinary authority, namely, the Assistant Security Officer on 21st August 1964, the Assistant Security Officer issued a notice to the applicant stating that the charge framed against him had been found to be proved at the enquiry conducted by the Divisional Inspector, Railway Protection Force, jabalpur, and asking him to show cause why he should not be removed from service. The petitioner gave his explanation which did not satisfy the Assistant security Officer, and on 6th October 1964 the impugned order removing the applicant from service was passed by the Assistant Security Officer.

( 3 ) LEARNED counsel appearing for the petitioner, while assailing the order dated the. 6th October 1964 of the Assistant Security Officer removing the petitioner from service, first contended that it was invalid inasmuch as in the notice to show cause, which was issued to the applicant on 21st August 1964, it was nowhere stated that the Assistant Security Officer concurred with the conclusions reached by the Enquiry Officer. This contention is without any force. It is no doubt true that the notice issued by the Assistant Security Officer did not say that he concurred with the conclusions reached by the Enquiry Officer. But for that reason the notice given to the applicant cannot be treated as a notice which did not afford a reasonable opportunity to the petitioner under Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. This is clear from the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Assam v. Bimal kumar, AIR 1963 SC 1612. In that case, it has been held that it is no doubt desirable that the dismissing authority should indicate in the second notice its concurrence with the conclusions of the enquiry officer before it issues a notice under Article 311 (2) of the Constitution, but the failure to so state expressly in the notice does not necessarily justify the conclusion that the notice given in that behalf does not afford a reasonable opportunity to the delinquent officer under article 311 (2) and amounts to a contravention of that article. According to the decision of the Supreme Court in Bimal Kumar's case, AIR 1963 SC 1612 (supra), it is only when the disciplinary authority differs from the findings, either wholly or partially, recorded in the enquiry report that it is essential that the provisional conclusions reached by the disciplinary authority must be stated in the notice in order to give the delinquent officer a reasonable opportunity to show cause under article 311 (2 ). In that case, it was also observed that when the disciplinary authority purports to proceed to issue the notice after accepting the enquiry report in its entirety and a copy of the enquiry report is sent with the notice to the officer concerned, then it should be obvious to the officer that the findings recorded against him by the enquiry officer have been accepted. Here also, the Assistant Security Officer accepted the report of