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1969 Supreme(MP) 107

High Court Of Madhya Pradesh
Bishambhar Dayal, C. J. , Shiv Dayal and Surajbhan, JJ.
RAMNARAYAN DHAN SINGH - Appellant
Versus
ANANDILAL RATANLAL MAHAJAN - Respondents
Letters Patent Appeal 16 Of 1962
Decided On : 10/17/1969

Advocates Appeared:
K.A.Chitale, S.D.SANGHI, V.S.PANDIT

Headnote:(1) Limitation Act, 1908 - S.15 - execution stayed against particular property, that is, stayed partially-period of stay should be excluded -word "execution" used in the section-meaning of-Civil P. C., 1908-S.48.

       If further progress of an execution of the decree is stayed by an injunction or order, the period of such stay shall be excluded in computing the period of limitation prescribed for any application for execution of that decree.

       The word 'execution' in section 15 embraces the various processes of execution, and any of them. The words "has been stayed by an injunction or order" are relateable to the factual position. An order of injunction staying execution of a decree may either be in general or unspecified terms. It may be in limited or specified terms where the sale of a particular property is stayed or the decree holder is restrained from taking possession of a specified property. In such cases also, it will be said that the execution has been stayed because a certain specified process in execution is also 'execution'.

       Where any injunction or order has prevented the decree holder from executing the decree, then, irrespective of particular stage of execution, or the particular property against which, or the particular judgment-debtor against whom, execution was stayed, the effect of injunction or order is to prolong the life of the decree itself by the same period during which the injunction or order remained in force. In other words, the period of stay shall be excluded from computation of the period of limitation for further execution without creating• any restriction on the rights of the decree-holder to execute the decree as he chooses. 1962 JLJ 1059=ILR 1964 MP 765 reversed. 30 MPLC 202, 60 IA 43 & AIR 1929 Pat. 597 distinguished. AIR 1940 Lah. 75, AIR 1924 All. 707, AIR 1924 Born, 383, AIR 1935 Mad. 352, AIR 1955 A.P. 229. AIR 1934 Cat 140, AIR 1944 Bom. 303, ILR 33 Cat 689, AIR 1959 Punj. 613. AIR 1928 Mad. 627 & AIR 1958 Cal. 1 dissented from ILR 1952 Mad 421 (FB) & ILR 9 Cal. 773 relied on. [Paras 33, 34 & 37

       (2) Interpretation of Statutes- plain meaning -should be adhered to-full effect should be given to the language-words cannot be added if meaning is not doubtful -Limitation Act, 1908-S.15.

       The provision of the Limitation Act, 1ikc any other statute, must receive a construction which the language in its plain meaning imports. It is the duty of the Court to give full effect to the language used in the Act. The Court cannot add words to a section unless the section as it stands is meaningless or of doubtful meaning. AIR 1963 SC 1882 & AIR 1959 SC 1331 relied on. (Para 32

SHIV DAYAL, J.

( 1 ) THIS Letters Patent Appeal from the judgment of Newaskar, J. , in Miscellaneous appeal No. 76 of 1959, was referred to the Full Bench by a Division Bench consisting of Dixit, C. J. and Tare, J. The question which arises in this appeal is whether an order staying a process in an execution proceeding, or a "partial stay", as it has been sometimes called, is within Section 15 of the Limitation Act and excludes the period during which it was in force. That question arose in the following circumstances, which have been stated to us by the learned counsel as undisputed.

( 2 ) ON June 14, 1927, a money decree was passed in Civil Suit No. 62 of Samvat 1983 in the Court of the District Judge, Ujjain, (in the erstwhile Gwalior State), in favour of the predecessors-in-title of Kamnarayan appellant, who is now the decree-holder, against the predecessors-in-title of Chunnilal and Anandilal (respondents 3 and 4), now the judgment-debtors. Aggrieved by that decree, an, appeal was preferred to the Gwalior State High Court. During the pendency of the appeal, and in connection with stay of execution, Ratanlal, father of Anandilal and jankilal (respondents 1 and 2) stood surety for the performance of the decree. On april 5, 1938, the appeal was dismissed by the Gwalior State High Court. Against the appellate judgment and decree, a revision was filed in the Judicial Committee of the Gwalior State (Revision No. 8 of Samvat 1995) under the laws of that State. The revision was dismissed on February 11, 1941. It is that decree of the Judicial committee which is under execution.

( 3 ) THE decree passed by the High Court was put in execution on February 23, 1939, (Execution Case No. 41 of Sam-vat 1995) against the judgment-debtors and the surety. Certain objections were raised by the surety which were overruled by order dated December 9, 1939. From that order an appeal was preferred to the gwalior State High Court (Appeal No. 9 of Samvat 1996), which was dismissed on july 22, 1940. Aggrieved by it, the surety preferred an appeal to the Judicial committee of the Gwalior State (Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 1 of Samvat 1997 ).

( 4 ) ON January 23, 1940, while the said appeal No. 9 of Samvat 1996 had been pending in the High Court certain immoveable properties of the surety (i. e. , five houses and land) situated in village Madhopura had been attached. They were to be put to sale, but by an order dated August 16, 1940, the Judicial Committe directed stay of the sale, while attachment was to continue. "taa HUKM SAANI QURQI QAYAM RAKHKAR NEELAM KEE MAZEED karravai MULTAVI RAKHI JAY. " on November 24, 1944, Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 1 of Samvat 1997 was disposed of in consequence of which the order of stay became dissolved. Execution was then resumed; it was dismissed for default; but again restored; eventually, on january 11, 1954, the decree-holder applied to the executing Court for sale of the attached property. On January 13, 1954, the decree-holder was directed to furnish by January 21, 1954, the particulars of the property to be sold. On January 21, 1954, the decree-holder's counsel reported no instructions. As the decree-holder himself did not appear, the execution was dismissed for default. ( 5 ) ON February 18, 1954, the decree-holder made a fresh application (No. 7 of 1954) for execution. It is that application for execution from which the present appeal has arisen.

( 6 ) RATANLAL surety pleaded bar of Section 48, Code of Civil Procedure. Pending those proceedings, Ratanlal died. His sons, Anandilal and Jankilal (respondents 1 and 2) were brought on record. They pursued the objection. The decree-holder resisted it on various grounds, two of them being that he was entitled to the benefit of Section 15 (1) of the Limitation Act because of the stay order passed by "the Judicial Committee on August 16, 1940, and, secondly, under Section 48 (2)of the Code of Civil Procedure because the judgment-debtor had by fraud or force pre













































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