( 1 ) THIS first appeal is by defendant No. 1 against the judgment and decree dated 18-1-1965, passed by the Additional District Judge, Shajapur, in Regular civil Suit No. 2-B of 1962.

( 2 ) THE suit is to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff in a motor accident on 4-5-1961 at about 4 P. M. near the Dak Bungalow at shajapur, when a jeep MPZ 1020 belonging to defendant No. 1 and driven by defendant No. 2 Yusufkhan collided headlong with the Ambassador car BMS 5800 owned by the plaintiff in which the plaintiff was travelling on his way from bombay to Calcutta. The collision took place about 40 feet outside the gate of the Dak Bungalow when the plaintiff's car was going to the Dak Bungalow and the Jeep was coming out of it. The plaintiff alleges that the Jeep was being driven rashly and negligently by its driver and it came out abruptly from the gate of the Dak Bungalow giving no opportunity to the car driver to avert the collision. Injuries were sustained by the plaintiff in this accident and in all a sum of Rs. 25,000 is claimed as damages under several heads.

( 3 ) THERE is no dispute that a Motor Accidents Claim Tribunal for the area had been duly constituted and was in existence from a date prior to the date of this accident. However instead of filing the claim before the Tribunal, the plaintiff filed a regular civil suit in the ordinary civil jurisdiction. An objection was taken to the filing of a regular civil suit, on the basis of Section 110-F of the Motor vehicles Act. The court below negatived the objection on the ground that the word 'accident' occurring in Section 110-F of the Act does not cover a tortious act on which the claim is based. For this reason, notwithstanding the existence of the Claims Tribunal, it was held that the claim in suit was beyond the jurisdiction of the Tribunal and as such was cognizable by a Civil Court. The court below accepted the plaintiffs claim to the extent of Rs. 16,369-45 p, and consequently decreed the same to this extent. Hence this appeal by the State of Madhya Pradesh.

( 4 ) THE first question relates to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to try such a suit in view of the express exclusion contained in Section 110-F of the Motor vehicles Act. Shri S. L. Garg, learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent No. 1 has reiterated the argument which found favour with the trial court. He contends that the jurisdiction of the Claims Tribunal is limited to claims for 'compensation' arising out of an 'accident' and the words 'accident' and 'compensation' have limited meaning. According to him, an 'accident' is an inevitable accident which does not result from any negligence or lack of foreseeability. Thus, according to him, claims before the Tribunal can be lodged only in respect of inevitable accidents and the remaining accidents which result from any negligence or rashness ere outside the jurisdiction of the Claims tribunal. To support the main argument based on this limited meaning of the word 'accident' Shri Garg also seeks support from use of the word 'compensation' which, he contends, has also a limited meaning and is not the same as 'damages'. On this basis, he argues that except for claims arising out of inevitable accidents, remaining claims resulting from injuries sustained from the use of the motor vehicle are to be made in the ordinary civil jurisdiction before the Civil Courts, which are tortious acts resulting from negligence or rashness. Such an argument runs counter to a Full Bench decision of this court in Mangilal v. Parasram, 1970 MPLJ 1 = (AIR 1971 Madh Pra 5) (FB ). For this reason, Shri Garg has challenged the correctness of the Full Bench decision. We have therefore, to see whether there is any merit in this argument because if the argument is acceptable, then the case will have to be referred to a larger bench for considering the correctness of the Full Bench decision.

( 5 ) SHRI Garg fairly concedes that in case his argum