( 1 ) THIS revision is directed against an order dated 12-12-1983 whereby the trial Court has rejected the objection raised against the preliminary decree which was passed by the trial Court in a suit for dissolution of partnership and accounts.

( 2 ) FOR purposes of taking accounts, Shri Bedekar, Advocate, Khandwa was appointed as Commissioner but it is said that he, without examining the account-books, submitted his report. Therefore, both the parties had filed their objections before the trial Court which were decided by the impugned order dated 12-12-1983 against which the present revision petition has been filed on 9-1-1984 by the applicant-defendant but at the request of the applicant's counsel, the revision was adjourned from time to time and lastly on 8-2-1984 it was admitted for hearing parties. Further proceedings in the trial Court are also stayed.

( 3 ) SHRI R. P. Verma and Shri S. C. Jain, counsel for the non-applicant raised a perliminary objection that in the trial Court, the suit has been finally decided by the judgment and decree dated 2-1-1984. Therefore, the impugned order dated 12-12-1983 which is under challenge in this revision petition is merged in the judgment and decree dated 25-1-1984 and hence this revision has become infructuous and now the applicant may vindicate his grievances against the order dated 12-12-1983 by filing a regular appeal and may challenge the validity of the impugned order in accordance with the provisions of S. 105, Code of Civil Procedure. Therefore, on this short ground this revision must be dismissed being infructuous.

( 4 ) SHRI R. K. Pandey counsel for the applicant contended that despite the final judgment and decree passed by the trial Court, this revision has not become infructuous and he submitted that the revision may be heard on merits and be decided accordingly. In support of his contention, he submitted that the provisions of S. 115, C. P. C. give ample and unfettered powers to this Court to decide the revision notwithstanding the fact that a final decree has been passed against which a regular appeal lies. In support of his contention, he cited authorities right from different High Courts in this country to the Supreme Court of India. He, however, based his arguments on the decisions reported in Yaqoob Ali v. Firm Haji Tajkhanji Ibrahimji, Udaipur, AIR 1984 Raj 1, Assanand v. Harish Kumar, AIR 1983 Pandh 23, Shrikishan Bharadwaj v. Manoharlal Gupta, (AIR 1977 Delhi. 226 ). Smt, Pushpa Rani v. Ramchandra, AIR 1977 Ori 23, Damodar v. Santosh Singh 1978 Jab LJ 769 and Maj. S. S. Khanna v. Brig, F. J. Dhillon, AIR 1964 SC 497)

( 5 ) FOR the sake of convenience, it is necessary to reproduce the relevant provisions of S, 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure which are as under : -"115 (1 ). The High Court may call for the record of any case which has been decided by any Court subordinate to such High Court and in which no appeal lies thereto, and if such subordinate Court appears. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (2) The High Court shall not, under this section, vary or reverse any decree or order against which an appeal lies either to the High Court or to any Court subordinate thereto. "shri Pandey laid much emphasis on the words "any case which has been decided" and argued that "case" is a word of comprehensive import. It includes further proceedings other than suits and is not restricted by anything contained in the section to the entirety of the proceedings in Civil Court, Therefore, if the impugned order is one which falls within the ambit of the phrase "any case which has been decided" it would be revisable. In support of this submission, he relied upon the decisions of Delhi High Court in Shrikishan Bharadwaj's case, (AIR 1977 Del 226) (supra) and of Maj. S. S. Kharma's case, (AIR 1964 SC 497) (supra) and in this context, he also cited the above referred other decisions of Rajasthan, Orissa and Punjab and Haryana High Courts.

( 6 ) THE words of limitation