Back
High Court Of Madhya Pradesh
T. N. SINGH
NEW INDIA ASSURANCE CO - Appellant
Versus
PHOOLWATI - Respondents
MISC. APPEAL 19 Of 1985
Decided On : 08/21/1985
It was contended on behalf of the appellant that the order passed by the Claims Tribunal was cryptic and is not sustainable in law being bereft of the requisite finding, necessary for passing the award. [Para 3]
Held: It is true that the order is cryptic. But the question is whether it is deficient in so far as the requisite finding is concerned. The other question is also to be considered is that should the High Court find the order to be deficient in any respect, and there is material before it from which the requisite finding can be arrived at by the High Court, even then whether any interference with the impugned order would be justified.
The Tribunal referred to the pleadings and also the documentary evidence, though not specified in so many words, to conclude that an accident took place an 30-6-1983 as alleged in the petition and that the deceased met his death as a result thereof. The Tribunal also referred to the FIR lodged in the Police Station. The only deficiency in the order is that in so many words it is not stated that one or more motor vehicles was or were involved in the accident. This in itself would not kill the order. [Para 4]
(2) Motor Vehicles Act, 1939-S. 92-A-nature of the provision-word 'use' occuring in sub-section (1)-import of-contributory negligence how far relevant.
The Legislature has advisedly laid a legal basis in the enactment of the very wholesome provision of section 92-A.
The language of the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 92-A is so transparent that legislative intent is not left hidden in any manner : the liability u/s 92-A is made indefeasible, peremptory and total. The question of proof is left apart; it is not required even to be pleaded that the claim for compensation u/s 92-A was justifiable on tortious considerations No wrongful act, neglect or default of the owner or owners of the vehicle or vehicles concerned or any other person has to be pleaded or proved. The mere fact that death or permanent disablement took place in which one or more motor vehicles is or are involved giving rise to the claim, is sufficient to raise a liability in terms of sub-section (3) of section 92-A. This position is rather buttressed by what is to be found in sub-section (4) which totally negates the concept of contributory negligence.
The word 'used' has to be read in its context and setting and indeed, it is a part of the phrase 'arising out of use of' which would not exclude cases of stationary vehicles. The very fact that the vehicle was on the road would bring it within the mischief of the expression 'arising out of use of'. Putting a vehicle on the road for running it would indeed be using the vehicle' a vehicle parked will not be in motion, but it will still be 'used'.'
The liability under section 92-A has a different character and it was not based on any tortious consideration, then the question of the liability being attached to a vehicle which ought to have been an 'offending vehicle' becomes otiose. The question of a civil offence, giving rise to a tortious liability does not at all arise in the case of section 92-A for the simple reason that it created 'no fault' liability which is manifested on the face of the provision. (1985) I CLR 420 followed. AIR 1976 SC 1785 & 1985 ACJ 1 differed from.
[Paras 6 & 6-A]
(3) Motor Vehicles Act, 1939-S. 100-D-first appeal-High Court has power to give its own finding on available record. [Para 8]
(4) Motor Vehicles Act, 1939-S. 92-A-'hit and run' theory-not covered by this section-duty of Courts in claims cases.
The language of section 92-A does not yield at all to the limited construction suggested by the 'hit and run' theory. [Para 9]
The Courts have a duty in this matter to promote and farther the intention of the Legislature by ensuring quick and instant payment of claims made under section 92-A.
[Para 10]
( 1 ) NARAYAN lost his life two years ago while commuting in a motor vehicle. This happened in the City of Gwalior, where the easy and convenient mode of public transport is the veritable "tempo". He was sitting by the side of the driver. The accident occurred when his Tempo' (Registration No. M. P. G. 7094) dashed against another Tempo (Registration No. M. P. G. 9848) which, according to the appellants, was stationary.
( 2 ) AN application under S. 92-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, for short, the 'act', for instant relief was filed by the dependents of Narayan, - his widow, his mother and his minor son, aged 9 years. In the petition, the persons impleaded as opposite parties were the driver and the owner of the Tempo bearing Registration No. M. P. G. 9848 and also the concerned Insurance Company. Objections were filed by all, contesting their liability, but without success. Learned Member, Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal') allowed the petition, passing an award of Rs. 15,000/-, which amount is statutorily fixed, and directed the same to be paid within one month. This was done on 15-2-1985, though the application was filed on 29-11-1984. However, it was two years after the accident and filing of the main claim under S. 110-A of the Act.
( 3 ) IN the present appeal, the insurer as well as the owner have come to this Court and have made an unholy effort to contest a holy claim, for which Legislature advisedly laid a legal basis in the enactment of the very wholesome provision of S. 92-A. Appellants' counsel Shri S. K. Dubey, has made strenuous effort to support the stand taken in the appeal and has forcefully pleaded appellants' case, relying mainly on a reported decision of Punjab and Haryana High Court - Oriental Fire and General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Beasa Devi, 1985 Acc CJ 1. He has also tried to find fault with the impugned order which, according to him, is very cryptic and is not sustainable in law being bereft of the requisite finding, necessary for passing the award. Counsel has prayed for my consideration mainly a three-fold submission. Firstly, the Tempo bearing registration No. M. P. G. 9848 was not the "offending vehicle" as it was not moving at the time of the accident and, therefore, it incurred no liability in terms of S. 92-A. Secondly, the claim petition ought to have been dismissed in limine for non-joinder of owner and insurer of the "offending vehicle", namely, the Tempo bearing registration No. M. P. G. 7094. Thirdly, the scope of S. 92-A ex facie, excludes claim for/by persons who are not pedestrians because the new provision was only meant to relieve misery arising out of "hit and run" situation.
( 4 ) I propose to deal first with the objection concerning the form and contents of the impugned order, its deficiencies. It is true that order is a cryptic order, but the question is, whether it is deficient in so far as the requisite finding is concerned. There would be a second question which is also to be considered by me should I find the order to be deficient in any respect. If there be material before me from which the requisite finding can be arrived at by this Court in this appeal, then, whether any interference with the impugned order would be justified. The Tribunal referred to the pleadings and also the documentary evidence, though not specified in so many words, to conclude that an accident took place on 30-6-1983 as alleged in the petition and that Narayan met his death as a result thereof. The Tribunal also referred to the F. I. R. lodged in the Police Station. The only deficiency in the order is that in so many words it is not stated that one or more motor vehicles was or were involved in the accident. However, in my opinion that itself would not kill the order. I say so for two reasons. Firstly, the reference to documentary evidence, and the Police report manifests application of mind of the Tribunal to the fact that in the accident, mot
An indispensable Tool for Legal Professionals, Endorsed by Various High Court and Judicial Officers
Please visit our Training & Support
Center or Contact Us for assistance
Scan Me!
India’s Legal research and Law Firm App, Download now!
For Daily Legal Updates, Join us on :
Back to top
