R. C. SHRIVASTAVA, J.

( 1 ) A Single Bench of this Court, while dealing with Second Appeal No. 35/86, feet difficulty, in view of some conflicting decisions of this Court, in deciding the question as to whether mere disclaimer of the landlord's title by the tenant entitles the landlord to a decree for his eviction in terms of S. 12 (1) (c) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961, without proving further that such disclaimer affects the plaintiff's interest adversely and substantially. Therefore, he moved the Hon'ble the Chief Justice for constituting a larger Bench for deciding the question. Thus, the said question came to be referred to this Division Bench.

( 2 ) THE question, as framed, is purely that of law. It presupposes that estoppel under S. 116 and there is also 'disclaimer' by him prior to the date of institution of the suit. We say so because there may be a case where, in certain set of circumstances, the estoppel under S. 116 of the Evidence Act may not be operative, entitling the tenant to challenge the plaintiff's title and his averments may not amount to 'disclaimer'. The terms 'disclaimer' has not been defined either in the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961, or in the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. In order to appreciate the import of that term, a reference to S. 111 (g) (2) of the Transfer of Property Act is necessary because the term has been in use since long to describe that provision in short. Under that provision, a lease of immovable property determines in case the lessee renounces his character as such by setting up a title in a third person or by claiming title in himself. Thus, in the context, the term 'disclaimer' has to be understood to mean renunciation by the tenant of his character as such by setting up a title in a third person or by claiming title in himself. So, a 'disclaimer' necessarily jeopardises the landlord's title; and, when the landlord's title itself is so jeopardised, the 'disclaimer' necessarily has the tendency to constitute an act which is likely to affect adversely and substantially the landlord's interest in the accommodation. That constitutes a ground for eviction under S. 12 (1) (c) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961. That Section was analysed by A. P. Sen, J. (as he then was) in the case of Ghulam Mohammad v. Poonam Chand, 1969 MPLJ 843 in the following words. "on a plain construction of Cl. (c) of Section 12 (1), it is manifest that eviction of tenant on disclaimer of title is included within its ambit. The provision is in three parts and each of them furnishes a ground for eviction, namely, (1) where the tenant has created a nuisuance, (2) where the tenant has done any act which is inconsistent with the purpose of the lease and (3) when the tenant has done any act which is likely to affect adversely and substantially the interest of the landlord thereon. It is noteworthy that this provision contemplates three different contingencies. The three clauses are separate and distinct, each being separated by the word "or". The third clause "has done any act which is likely to affect adversely and substantially the interest of the landlord" is wide enough to include acts of denial of the landlord's title". * * * * * * "a denial of the landlord's title undoubtedly affects him adversely, and it also affects him substantially. "'

( 3 ) THE question again came up before a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Pandit Ramjilal Tiwari v. Vijai Kumar, 1970 MPLJ 50 : (1970 Cri LJ 1176 ). In that case, the Division Bench observed - "it is hardly necessary to add that disclaimer of title by the tenant is a ground for eviction included in Cl. (c) of S. 12 (1) of the Madhya Pradesh Act Accommodation Control, 1961". The view taken by Single Bench in the case of Ghulam Mohammad (1969 MPLJ 843) (supra) was, thus, affirmed by the Division Bench. Both the said decisions were considered by G. P. Singh, J. (as he then was) in the case of Nebraj v. Amrit Kaur (1973 Jab LJ 445 ).

Click Here to Read the rest of this document