( 1 ) SATTE-PE-SATTA or double wager of the auction-purchaser, it is seriously complained by appellants, has perverted judicial process. He has withdrawn the purchase-money. Decree-holder has been paid off. Why auction-purchasers' unjust enrichment must take place under a defunct judicial writ ?

( 2 ) CONTENTIONS aforesaid are pivotal and common to the decision to be rendered in the two appeals and indeed for the self-same reason the appeals are heard analogously though the older one, S. A. No. 107 of 1975, raises other important questions of law also and is, therefore, being treated first. It arises out of a suit, instituted on 3-5-65, praying, inter alia, for a declaration that the house "shobha Bhawan" attached in Execution Case No. 67 of 1960 of the court of Civil Judge, Morena, was not liable to be sold in public auction and that attachment and auction sale of that house were illegal, inoperative in law and void.

( 3 ) DURING last twenty-seven years of travail the journey which parties have made to his court was not made on boulevard only. Lanes and alleys which parties crossed are to be revisited also for appreciating and disposing of rival contentions. The appeals were heard in part, in instalments, and on 22-7-1987, relying on Apex Court's rulings when oral prayer was made for an opportunity being given to make appropriate application to bring on record relevant facts, I had no hesitation to grant the prayer. However, I directed copies of any document filed to be served on respondents' counsel and an opportunity to file reply was also given. From both sides have come, accordingly, on record, facts and chansmatic events in the form of additional evidence, comprising mainly of records of judicial proceedings. Indeed, documents filed by appellants' counsel are certified copies of applications made and orders passed in execution proceedings.

( 4 ) ALTHOUGH I have taken on record documents filed on both sides it is still necessary to note that respondents, though filing and relying themselves on certain documents, objected to the exercise undertaken by the appellants on the ground that O. 41, R. 27 C. P. C. did not sanction such a course. Few words I propose to speak first to say that the objection has no merit. The shortest possible way to dispose of the objection is to underline the constitutional imperative of reading R. 27 in the context of R. 33 of O. 41. It is the constitutional duty of the appellate Court to effectuate fully the legislative intent underlying R. 33, which contemplates relief to be given in appeal to be moulded to suit circumstances obtaining on the date of disposal of the appeal to do complete justice to parties on the one hand and to curtail circuity and prolixity of litigation on the other hand. The language of R. 33 is wide enough to contemplate conferment of adequate power on appellate Court "to pass any decree and make any order which ought have been passed or made and to pass or make such further or other decree or order as the case may require". The amplitude of appellate Court's power contemplated under Cl. (b) of R. 27 (1) must, ex hypothesi, be given full scope to operate. The last. portion of the sub-rule with cl. (b) is as follows :" (B) the Appellate Court requires any document to be produced or any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce judgement, or for any other substantial cause, the Appellate Court may allow such evidence or document to be produced, or witness to be examined. "the appellate court is obviously mandated to ask parties to produce any documents or witness if the court is of the opinion that such evidence may "enable it to pronounce judgement" to do complete justice between the parties, to their causes and cases. Indeed the residuary clause - "for any other substantial cause" - amply manifests this intention of the Legislature.

( 5 ) IN taking the above view I would also rely on Art. 39-A of the Constitution which ordains in the country a just lega