K. L. SHRIVASTAVA, J.

( 1 ) THIS is an application dt. 2-9-88 under S. 482, Cr. P. C. 1973 (for short 'the Code') for quashing the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 182 of 1981 under Ss. 147 and 323. IPC pending in the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class Indore.

( 2 ) THE application has been made on the ground that the aforesaid criminal case was filed in the year 1978 and during all these years not a single witness for the prosecution has been examined though the learned trial Court had been issuing warnings and instructions for production of evidence.

( 3 ) THE submission of the petitioner's learned counsel is that the pendency of a criminal case against a person involves curtailment of his liberty and delay in the trial of the case unless it is occasioned due to the fault of the accused or due to exceptional reasons, has to be characterised as violative of Art. 21 of the Constitution of India which guarantees speedy trial. It is contended that in the circumstances of the case it is in the interest of justice that the same is dropped. ( 4 ) LEARNED counsel for the State has opposed the application.

( 5 ) THE point for consideration is whether the application deserves to be allowed.

( 6 ) IN relation to Art. 21 of the Constitution on which the learned counsel for the petitioner relies this is what has been observed in Hussainara's case. AIR 1979 SC 1360. "a procedure prescribed by law for depriving a persons of his liberty cannot be reasonable, fair or must unless that procedure ensures a speedy trial for determination of the guilt of such person. No procedure which does not ensure a reasonably quick trial, can be regarded as reasonable, fair or just and it would fall foul of Art. 21. There can therefore, be no doubt that speedy trial, and by speedy trial we mean reasonably expeditious trial is an integral and essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined in Act. 21. "in the decision in Maneka Gandhi's, AIR 1978 SC 597 with reference to Art. 21 of the Constitution, it has been held that the 'procedure prescribed by law' contemplated therein has to stand the test of one or more of the fundamental rights conferred in a given situation and must ex-hypothesi, it must also be liable to be tested with reference to Art. 14 which guaranteed equality therefore law. It has been pointed out that principle of reasonableness which is an essential element of equality or non-arbitrariness pervades Art. 14 and the procedure contemplated under Art. 21 must answer the test of reasonableness in order to be in conformity with Art. 14 Reference has also been made to the principle of Audi Alteram Partem which mandates that on one shall be condemned unheard, and is a part of the rules of natural justice. In this very connection the decision in Sheikh Salim's, 1985 Jab LJ 28 may also be profitably perused. What may be termed a reasonable period may no doubt vary with the facts and circumstances of each case.

( 7 ) IN the decision in Sheela Barse's case, 1986 Cur Cri J 249 (SC) it has been held that right to speedy trial is a fundamental right implicit in Art. 21 of the Constitution and the consequence of its violation would be that the prosecution itself would be liable to be quashed on the ground that it is in branch of the fundamental right. The case relates to delinquent child and six months' period or inquiry under the Bal Adhiniyam 1970 was held proper. Therein it has also been observed that total inadequacy of strength of the Presiding Officers of Courts is one of the primary reasons why trials of criminal case are delayed. In the decision in Suk Das's case, 1986 Cur Cri J 165 it has been held that in certain circumstances right to free legal assistance at State cost is the fundamental right under the Article and that the Magistrate or the Judge is under obligation to inform the accused about the same. In the circumstances of the case it was also held that it was in the interact of justice that no fresh trial should

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