High Court Of Madhya Pradesh
T. N. SINGH
GANPATLAL - Appellant
Versus
NANDLAL HASWANI - Respondents
M. A. 84 Of 1987
Decided On : 09/12/1988
INJUNCTION - SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACT - TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT, 1882, SECTION 52 - CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1908, ORDER 39, RULES 1 AND 2 - SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT, 1877, SECTIONS 20, 37 AND 41 - COURT HELD THAT THE PLAINTIFF FAILED TO ESTABLISH A STRONG PRIMA FACIE CASE, BALANCE OF CONVENIENCE, AND IRREPARABLE INJURY, AND THEREFORE, THE TEMPORARY INJUNCTION GRANTED BY THE TRIAL COURT WAS NOT SUSTAINABLE.
Fact of the Case:
Plaintiff filed a suit for specific performance of a contract for sale of land against the defendant. The trial court granted a temporary injunction restraining the defendant from selling the land to a third party. The defendant appealed the order.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that the plaintiff failed to establish a strong prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable injury, and therefore, the temporary injunction granted by the trial court was not sustainable.
Issues: Whether the plaintiff established a strong prima facie case for specific performance of the contract.
Ratio Decidendi: The court held that the plaintiff failed to establish a strong prima facie case because he did not show that he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, and he did not show that he would suffer irreparable injury if the injunction was not granted. The court also held that the balance of convenience did not lie in the plaintiff's favor because the defendant had already purchased the land and started construction on it.
Final Decision: The court allowed the appeal and set aside the temporary injunction.
( 1 ) IN the suit filed by respondent 1 in the Court below, appellant figured as defendant 13. In that suit, an order of temporary injunction being passed against him on 8-5-1987, he is aggrieved and has appealed. I have gone through the impugned order and I must say that criticism of appellant's counsel against that order of being cryptic and perfunctory is well justified.
( 2 ) THERE is no discussion at all in the impugned order of pleadings of parties to reach the conclusion that the plaintiff had a strong prima facie case to go to trial except the cryptic finding that in the suit for specific performance of contract for sale of the suit land, in the course of trial, it had to be determined to which of the parties had breached the contract. Surprisingly, despite having noted that the contract sought to be enforced was executed by defendant 2 in favour of the plaintiff and that the said defendant had sold the land to others and further sales were made of the same land, learned Additional District Judge did not take care to examine if under those circumstances, plaintiff could still hope to succeed in the suit and get a decree for specific performance. Similarly, even after having found that defendant 13 had got the sale deed executed in his favour by defendant No. 10 (herein respondent No. 11) on 22-11-1985 and had even started construction by digging foundation, little care was taken to consider in whose favour balance of convenience lay and whether the plaintiff would suffer irreparable injury if the temporary injunction prayed was not granted. Appellant's counsel is right, therefore, in submitting that in passing the impugned order, the court below did not act judiciously and as such the exercise of discretion by that Court cannot be upheld as unassailable and not liable to interference. 2a. Admittedly, as far back as on 17-1-1981, the agreement, in question, for sale of the suit land was executed by defendant 1 in favour of the plaintiff and the suit was filed much belatedly on 3-5-1984, only against defendants 1 to 7. It was only on 23-11-1984 that appellant's vendor, respondent No. 11, was impleaded in the suit. Be it also mentioned in this connection that the said respondent had purchased the land from respondents 3 to 5 who, in turn, had got the land similarly by a registered sale deed executed in their favour on 23-6-1982 by respondent 2. It had also come on record in the pleadings of parties (written statement by second respondent/defendnat 1 having been filed on 22-4-1984) that the plaintiff may not have been ready and willing to perform his part of the contract inasmuch as he took no steps to get the sale deed executed despite notice being served on him by respondent 2 on 25-2-1982 even after the period of sixty days contemplated under the agreement for execution of sale deed had expired on 16-9-1981. Not only these facts did not enter into learned Additional District Judge's consideration in reaching the conclusion concerning plaintiff's prima facie case, it is clear on the face of the impugned order that the court below did not care to look into the contract itself copy of which was filed by the plaintiff in support of his case.
( 3 ) INDEED, Cl. 3 of that contract is of signal relevance inasmuch as mention is made there of the suit land being proposed to be sold with the structures (Patore) existing thereon and in that view of the matter, the learned Additional District Judge was required to consider if plaintiff's plea that he was willing and ready to get the sale deed executed, but the other side was the defaulter could at all be accepted. Under the agreement in question, a sum of Rs. 5,000/- only had been paid out of total consideration of Rs. 33,000/- and the further contemplation was that expenses for execution of the sale deed and for permission to be obtained, "if necessary", from Land Ceiling Officer, shall be borne by the plaintiff. In that connection, learned Additional District Judge
Login now and unlock free premium legal research
Login to SupremeToday AI and access free legal analysis, AI highlights, and smart tools.
Login
now!
India’s Legal research and Law Firm App, Download now!
Copyright © 2023 Vikas Info Solution Pvt Ltd. All Rights Reserved.