( 1 ) DEFENDANTS have instituted this second appeal, as the Court of appeal below has reversed the findings as also the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court. The suit was for restoration of possession and permanent injunction, which was dismissed and in the appeal that was decreed.

( 2 ) THERE can be no doubt that any question germane for decision in this appeal is concluded by findings of fact by the Court below. The trial Court disbelieved the evidence adduced by the plaintiff in support of his case that they had been possessing the suit land continuously over 30 years, and their further case that they were joint owners of the land with Rajaram from whom they purchased his half share and had become full owners of the property has also been disbelieved. The defendants, according to the plaintiffs, started interfering with their possession on 21-7-1970, when they were putting up a construction. The suit was filed on 9-9-1970. ( 3 ) ON re-appreciating the entire documentary and oral evidence, the Court of appeal below reached the categorical finding and concluded that the land had been in possession of the plaintiffs and they had obtained permission for raising construction on that land from the Gram Panchayat. Further, that Defendant Daulatsingh had misused the privilege (of few days' user allowed for a marriage) of licence by putting up a temporary shed (Tapra) in 1970 for dispossessing the plaintiffs. Accordingly, on the basis of their long possession, the plaintiffs were entitled to a decree for permanent injunction to protect possession of the suit land and for a direction against the defendant respondents prohibiting them to interfere with the construction work of the plaintiffs.

( 4 ) APPELLANTS' counsel Shri K. N. Gupta has submitted and relied on Madhusudan Das v. Narayani Bai, AIR 1983 SC 114, to submit that their Court's appreciation of evidence was binding on the appellate Court. However, in that regard it has to be observed that in that case the appellate Court was High Court and therefore, the principle enunciated before their Lordships, in my opinion, would not apply to the instant case as Section 100, C. P. C. as amended, interdicts seriously High Court interference on facts. In appeal, the appellate judgment challenged in High Court can only be examined on "substantial question of law". This position, after amendment of the Code in 1976, has crystallised explicitly and more rigidly the position that obtained earlier as well. In that regard reliance of respondents' counsel Shri Arun Mishra on the decision in Ramappa v. Bojjappa, AIR 1963 SC 1633, is very appropriate. It was laid down categorically in that case that "finding of fact is a matter of decision of Court of facts and cannot be agitated in a second appeal.

( 5 ) HOWEVER, some consideration has to be definitely given to Shri Gupta's contention based on a decision of a learned single Judge of this Court in the case of Lacchoo v. Dhaniram short-noted in, 1962 Jab LJ 1962 (SN) 72. In that case it was held that in very suit filed on the basis of dispossession for title. It is necessary for the plaintiffs to establish his title and no decree for possession of title can be passed. That observation was made construing S. 110 of the Evidence Act as the plaintiff had invoked that provision for presumption of title by possession. I have no doubt that reliance on that decision by Shri Gupta is wholly inappropriate, in the facts and circumstances of this case.

( 6 ) THE law, in my opinion, is well settled. Referende may be made in that connection to few decisions of the Apex Court.

( 7 ) REFERENCE in Yeshwant Singh's case (supra) was made to Section 9 of Specific Relief Act to state that the question of title has not to be considered in a suit filed to enforce that provision. Midnapur Zamindary Co. Ltd. v. Naresh Narayan Roy, AIR 1924 PC 144, was noted and the law cited therein by the Privy Council was approved. In Somnath (supra) again Secti