A husband's conduct that creates a situation driving his wife to commit suicide amounts to abetment of suicide under Section 306, Indian Penal Code.

( 1 ) APPELLANT-ARJUN Kushwah has been convicted under Section 306, Indian Penal Code and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for four years and to a fine of Rs. 1,000/ -.

( 2 ) DECEASED-REKHA was wife of the appellant, who died on account of hundred per cent burn injuries sustained by her on 16-2-1995 within three years of her marriage. The incident took place in the house of her husband.

( 3 ) THE prosecution case is that the appellant was demanding a motorcycle from the parents of the deceased. He was paid Rs. 15,000/- and again an amount of Rs. 5,000/- was paid to him. He used to beat and torture his wife. On 16-2-1995 at 6. 30 P. M. the mother-in-law of the deceased asked her to take her son aged about one year to the first floor of the house. Rekha replied that she has just come to the ground floor with the child. At that time, the accused asked the deceased why she was not obeying her mother-in-law. He started assaulting her with fisticuffs. She took up the kerosene can from the kitchen and poured kerosene on her. Her husband, the appellant provoked her to ignite fire. She set her ablaze then and there. She died in the hospital after two days as she had sustained hundred per cent burn injuries.

( 4 ) THE appellant pleaded not guilty. The trial Court after appreciation of the evidence on record found that the appellant has abetted the commission of suicide by his wife.

( 5 ) IN this appeal it is argued that the death of Rekha was accidental and from the evidence on record it is not established that the appellant abetted the commission of suicide by his wife.

( 6 ) THE evidence on record has been carefully scrutinised by this Court. The prosecution case is based mainly on the dying declaration Ex. P-3 recorded by T. S. Ahirwar (P. W. 3), Naib Tahsildar and the Executive Magistrate on 16-2-95 at 9. 30 P. M. in Hamidia Hospital, Bhopal. He has deposed that before proceeding to record dying declaration of Rekha, he got the certificate of the doctor on duty on Ex. P-3 that the patient was fit to give the statement. At the close of this dying declaration the doctor on duty has again certified that the patient has given the statement in full consciousness. He took fifteen minutes to record the statement of Rekha, which is being reproduced in extenso as under :-

( 7 ) THE statement of the deceased shows that it gives full details of the incident. It is coherent and consistent. It furnishes an inbuilt assurance that the declarant was fully conscious and was not suffering from any confusion or hallucination.

( 8 ) IT is now firmly well settled from a series of the decisions of the Supreme Court commencing from Khusalrao v. State of Bombay, AIR 1958 SC 22 : (1958 Cri LJ 106) to Najjam v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1998 SC 682 : (1998 Cri LJ 866) that dying declaration is admissible in evidence on the principle of necessity and can form the basis for conviction if it is found to be reliable. While it is in the nature of an exception to the general rule forbidding hearsay evidence, it is admitted on the premise that ordinarily a dying person will not falsely implicate an innocent person in the commission of a serious crime. It is this premise which is considered strong enough to set-off the need that the maker of the statement should state so on oath and be cross-examined by the person who is sought to be implicated. In order that a dying declaration may form the sole basis for conviction without need for independent corroboration it must be shown that the person making it had the opportunity of identifying the person implicated and it is thoroughly reliable and free from blemish. If, in the facts and circumstances of the case, it is found that the maker of the statement was in fit state of mind and had voluntarily made the statement on the basis of personal knowledge without being influenced by other and the Court on strict scrutiny finds it to be reliable there is no rule of law or even of prudence that such a reliable