The Claims Tribunal has inherent jurisdiction to adjust equities between parties while disposing of the claim for compensation under S. 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, including the right of the insurer to claim exoneration or reimbursement from the owner of the insured vehicle or from the owner of the other vehicle involved in the accident.

( 1 ) IN this appeal u/s. 173, Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, for short, the Act, the Award passed by Claims Tribunal under S. 140 is challenged by the Insurer on a short ground. The question is, if it was incumbent on the said Tribunal to apportion or "specify" in the impugned award the "no fault liability" arising out of accident in which two motor vehicles were used so that the entire amount is not required to be paid by the Insurer who is required to discharge that liability of owner of one of the vehicles only.

( 2 ) WHEN the appeal came up for admission, I entertained doubt if it could be admitted as the appellant is required as per S. 173 to make deposit of Rs. 25,000/ - or 50% of the amount awarded, whichever is less. In the instant case, claimant/respondent No. 1 has been awarded Rs. 7,500/ -. Although my attention was drawn to this Court's decision in Jaswant Rao v. Kamlabai, AIR 1990 Madh Pra 354, rendered at the Indore Bench and it was pointed out that the impugned award being passed on 10-1-1989, no deposit need be made as the new Act came into force only from 1-7-1989, I failed to persuade myself to accept the law laid down to be correct. Happily, appellant having duly deposited Rs. 3,750/-, being 50% of the amount of the award, I am relieved of the anxiety. Otherwise, it might have been necessary for me to make a reference to Full Bench for reconsideration of the law laid down in the D. B. decision in aforesaid Jaswant Rao's case (AIR 1990 Madh Pra 354 ). I may, however, still observe that inspiration for that decision came from a chain of other decisions of this Court on the scope of S. 6, General Clauses Act, 1897 (referred in S. 217 (4) of the Act ). But, all those decisions have been overruled recently in Babulal's case AIR 1990 Madh Pra 317 (FB ).

( 3 ) ON facts, it is undisputed that two vehicles were involved in the accident and the claimant who sustained injury and has got an interim award for that, was travelling in bus No. C. P. H. 8440, owned by respondent No. 3, Madhya Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation, for short, the "corporation". The bus collided with truck bearing registration No. CIW 7432 owned by respondent No. 2, but the truck is admittedly insured with the appellant. Shri Johri, appellant's counsel, contended that case of collision prima facie made it a case of contributory negligence of the vehicles involved in the accident and that had to be determined by the Tribunal when passing award finally u/s. 168 of the Act. Still, even at the stage of making interim award u/s. 140, the Tribunal was not excused of its duty to apportion "no fault liability" between the owners of the two vehicles involved in the accident and that duty was ingrained in the provision under which the award was passed and that the expression used in S. 140 (1), "jointly and severally" explicitly referred to that duty.

( 4 ) COUNSEL for the Corporation (respondent No. 3), Shri Khot, conceded that he failed to lay hand on any reported decision in regard to the controversy mooted in the appeal. However, he cited certain decisions to which I shall advert in due course. For the present, however, I must state at once that the impugned award follows substantially the statutory mandate. The sum awarded is made payable by non-applicants Nos. 2 and 3, namely, the Insurer and the Corporation; the other non-applicant, Bhagwandas, who was owner of the truck insured with the appellant has been left out. In any case, that minor flaw in the award does not invalidate it for the reason that the owner's liability is passed on statutorily to the Insurer in terms of S. 149 (1) of the Act and as such, the Tribunal did not act illegally or arbitrarily or without jurisdiction in naming the Insurer as the person who had to discharge the liability under the award because he had to discharge the same in terms of the said provision.

( 5 ) IN my view, there is material difference between the phraseology used by the Legislature in Ss.