An award made by a Court under the Land Acquisition Act is not a decree for purposes of Article 11, Schedule II, of the Court-fees Act, and therefore, fixed court fee is payable.

( 1 ) THIS is an appeal under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act against the award made by the District Court. What court-fee on the memorandum of appeal and on the cross-objection is payable is the question. According to the appellant, the court-fee payable is as prescribed under Article 11, Schedule II of the Court-fees Act and not ad-valorem. To support this contention, the appellant relies on a Full Bench decision of this Court in Shantilal v. Town Improvement Trust, Ratlam, AIR 1978 M. P. 8. which in turn draws support from the decision of the Supreme Court in Diwan Brothers v Central Bank of India, AIR 1976 SC 1503. With this view of the Full Bench we are bound. The learned Deputy Advocate General, however, referred to this Court a later decision of the Supreme Court in C. G. Ghanshamdas v. Collector of Madras, AIR 1987 SC 180, and contended that a decision by the Court is an order and not a decree and, therefore, ad-valorem court-fee is payable on the amount of the difference between the amount awarded by the Court and the amount claimed in appeal. This decision in Ghanshamdas's case (supra) turns upon the term 'order' mentioned in Section 51 of the Tamil Nadu Court-fees and Suits Valuation Act (14 of 1955 ). Section 51 of the Act provides that the fee payable under the Act on a memorandum of appeal against an order relating to compensation under any Act for the time being in force for the acquisition of property for public purposes shall be computed on the difference between the amount awarded and the amount claimed by the appellant. The Supreme Court held that the 'order' referred to in Section 51 of that Act need not be an order of a civil court as defined in Section 2 (14), C. P. C. but should be an order relating to compensation under any Act for the time being in force for acquisition of property for public purposes. The Supreme Court further held that even if the expression 'order' simpliciter has to be understood in the sense in which that expression is defined in Section 2 (14) of the Code of Civil Procedure, the word 'order' found in Section 51 of the Act (Tamil Nadu Act); has to be read differently having regard to the words which qualify that expression in that section, namely, 'relating to compensation under any Act for the time being in force for the acquisition of properties'. The said order need not be an order of the civil Court only. It was, therefore, held that the award made under Section 8 of the Requisitioning Act and the appeal filed under Section 11 of the Requisitioning Act were squarely governed by Section 51 of the Tamil Nadu Court-fees Act. Court-fee had to be paid on ad-valorem basis as provided under Article 1, Schedule I of the Act. It was, therefore, held that the residuary Article of that Act was not attracted. It is this feature which, in our opinion, distinguishes the present case, which is governed by the decision of the Supreme Court in Diwan Brothers v. Central Bank of India, AIR 1976 SC 1503, and applied and followed by the Full Bench of this Court in Shantilal's case (supra ). The three-Judges Bench of the Supreme Court in Diwan Brother's case (supra) were concerned with the expression 'decree' as used in Schedule II, Article 11, of the Court-fees Act, as is our concern in the present case. It was held that it is referable to a decree as defined in Section 2 (2) C. P. C. During the Course of the judgment, while considering the term 'decree' as used in Section 2 (2), C. P. C. , the essentials of that term were expressed thus : (i) that the adjudication must be given in a suit; (ii) that the suit must start with a plaint and culminate in a decree and (iii) that the adjudication must be formal and final and must be given by a civil or revenue court. In that case, the Court was concerned with an award made by order of the Tribunal, under the Displaced Persons (Debts Adjustment) Act. Since the Tribunal was not a Civil Court, it was held that the order awarding compe