The main legal point established in the judgment is that a tenant from a mortgagee cannot claim protection under the Rent Act after the redemption of the mortgage, unless there is a specific clause in the mortgage-deed allowing continued possession.

( 1 ) ANANDRAO and Gajanandrao were brothers. They owned the suit property. These two brothers mortgaged the suit house by registered mortgage-deed dated 28-4-1947 in favour of Radhakishan for a sum of Rs. 1,500/ -. It was a possessory mortgage. A supplementary mortgage of Rs. 800/- was also made in favour of Radhakishan. Later on there was a partition between the mortgagee Anandrao and Gajanandrao with the result that the suit, house fell to the share of Anandrao. In the meanwhile the mortgagee Radhakishan, transferred this fights in favour of Ramgopal.

( 2 ) THE mortgagee, Radhakishan, had let out two rooms on the ground floor of the mortgaged house to the present appellant Hariram as a monthly tenant on a rent of Rs. 35/- per month. We are not concerned with the possession of the other portion of the house.

( 3 ) ANANDRAO filed the original suit for redemption as he had deposited the entire money and costs both payable under the mortgage on 3-8-1972. Anandrao also claimed possession by evicting Hariram (present appellant) from the suit premises. In this suit Ramgopal was arrayed as defendant No. 1, Laxmibai (widow of Radhakishan) as defendent No. 2, Hariram, the tenant (present appellant) as defendant No. 3 and Gajanandrao, the brother of Anandrao as defendant No. 4.

( 4 ) THE trial Court decreed the suit for redemption as against Ramgopal and Laxmibai. As there was no question of accounts, a final decree for redemption was passed. It was further held that Hariram, the tenant, from the mortgagee, had no right to continue in possession after redemption and, therefore a decree for eviction was passed against him.

( 5 ) THE mortgagee Laxmibai and the purchaser from mortgagee Ramgopal did not file any appeal against the decree for redemption. Nor did brother Gajanandrao take any appeal from the judgment of the trial Court. Thus the decree for redemption vis-a-vis these three defendants undisputedly become final.

( 6 ) HARIRAM, the tenant, filed first appeal against only eviction part of the decree as is clear from the memo of appeal. The first appeal filed and, therefore, it is Hariram who has now come up in second appeal against confirmation of decree for eviction.

( 7 ) LEARNED counsel for the appellant first Of all contended that the mortgage. Ex. P-I, has not been duly proved. It so happened that Ex. P-1 was filed by the plaintiff as a manuscript copy of the mortgage. The counsel for the mortgagee and his vendor admitted the document and so it was marked as Ex. P-I. The learned counsel was at pains to contend that there was no copy of endorsement of the registration on back of the document, that it was not a certified copy and, therefore, the mortgage was not at all proved. The contention was very laboriously put during appeal. The contention was, however, repelled by the respondent by submitting that the fact of mortgage as pleaded by the plaintiff was admitted by the mortgagee as well as his vendor Ramgopal in the written statement paras 1 and 3.

( 8 ) THE contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the fact of mortgage was not admitted by the present appellant Hariram, (who) war silenced by reference to his plea in para 3 of the written statement in answer to para 3 of the plaint in which the mortgage with full particulars is pleaded. Para 3 of the written statement of Hariram merely denied the allegation for want of knowledge.

( 9 ) LET the question of proof of partition be also dealt with at this stage as it sails in the same boat as the fact of mortgage regarding its proof. The position of pleadings regarding allegation of partition between Anandrao and Gajanandrao made in the plaint is the same as that of the mortgage. In other words, the present appellant had denied allegation of partition for want of knowledge.

( 10 ) ). It is to be seen that in the case of Samrathmal v. Union of India, Ministry of Railway, AIR 1959 Madh Pra 305, a Division Bench of G. P. Bhutt, C. J. and T. P. Naik, J. he