SHACHEENDRA DWIVEDI, J.

( 1 ) THEY are heard on admission.

( 2 ) THIS second appeal is preferred by the plaintiff against the impugned judgment and decree which has confirmed the judgment and decree of the trial Court.

( 3 ) THE suit was filed by the appellant for declaration and permanent injunction alleging that he was the bhumiswami and person in possession of the disputed lands, and was, therefore, entitled to get his name so entered in the revenue records. It was also prayed that the respondents be permanently injuncted not to alienate the suit property and not to interfere with the plaintiff's possession of the disputed lands.

( 4 ) THE dispute has a chequered history. The parties are close relatives. During the pendency of the suit, a written-deed of compromise under Order 23, Rule 3 of C. P. C. was filed on 28-4-92 in respect of the disputed lands, which was signed by the plaintiff-appellant and respondents 1 to 4. The signatures of the parties were also duly verified by their respective counsel. But later on, plaintiff-appellant Kailash Narain filed an application in the Court on 24-7-92 that he does not want to stick to the compromise nor wants it to be verified and recorded, but prayed for its cancellation because the conditions agreed upon between the plaintiff and the respondents were allegedly not complied with by the defendants. The further allegation was that defendants had played fraud on the plaintiff for entering into compromise and had not carried out the conditions. The compromise was, therefore, prayed to be rejected, as no order thereon was passed by the Court till then.

( 5 ) THE learned trial Court considered the circumstances of the filing of compromise, duly signed by the parties and verified by their counsel. As no specific allegation had also appeared in the application moved by the plaintiff for the rejection of compromise, the learned trial Court found that the compromise was lawful, and, therefore, passed the decree in terms of the compromise. The appeal preferred by the appellant was also dismissed by the lower appellate Court under the impugned judgment.

( 6 ) SHRI K. K. Lahoti, learned counsel for the appellant has very vehemently argued in this Court that firstly, the learned Courts below erred in passing the decree in terms of compromise, in respect of which no evidence or even the statements of the parties were recorded. Secondly, that the compromise could not be acted upon as it was not lawful since the fraud was played by the defendants on the plaintiff-appellant. It was also contended that in view of the allegation of fraud, the learned Court below was bound to hold an enquiry and could not have acted upon the compromise, which was sought to be rejected by the plaintiff at the later stage. ( 7 ) SHRI Arun Mishra, Advocate appearing for the respondents urged forcefully that under Order 23, Rule 3 of C. P. C. , the Court was required to see whether the compromise was lawful or not. Shri Mishra in support of his contention has placed reliance on Bhaja Govinda Maikap v. Janaki Dei, AIR 1980 Ori 108; wherein, the Court had considered the powers of the Court under Order 23, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, in the face of an objection of one of the parties to the compromise. Therefore, Shri Mishra submitted that the lower appellate Court also committed no mistake in dismissing the appeal.

( 8 ) I have considered the rival contentions and perused the records.

( 9 ) I have found that the compromise was filed by the parties on 28-4-92, but as the Presiding Judge was on leave, no order could be passed on that date, and the case was adjourned for 1-5-92. On 1-5-92, one Indrabhan Singh had filed an application under Order 1, Rule 10 of C. P. C. read with Order 6, Rule 17 and Section 151 of C. P. C. , in which it was alleged that he holds the general power of attorney from the plaintiff in respect of the suit lands, and when the compromise was filed by the parties in the Court on 28-4-92, plaint

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