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2000 Supreme(MP) 490

2001 (1) JLJ 122
Dipak Misra, J.
Haricharan and others v. M. Ojha and others
Civil Revn. No. 2500 of 1998: against the order of II Additional District,
Judge, Bilaspur, passed in Civil Suit No. 22-A of 1995. Decided on 12.5.2000.

Advocates:
Sanjay Agrawal for applicants;
Sanjay Kumar Agrawal for non-applicants.

Headnote:(1) Civil P.C., 1908 -- S. 115 -- question of deficit court-fees involved -- High Court has no power to interfere in revision.

       When the question of deficit court-fee is involved in the case, the High Court has no power under section 115 of the C.P.C. to interfere. [Para 5

       Whether proper court-fee is paid on a plaint is primarily a question between the plaintiff and the State. The jurisdiction in revision exercised by the High Court under S. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure is strictly conditioned by Cls. (a) to (c) thereof. AIR 1961 SC 1299 followed. 1996 (2) Vidhi Bhasvar 194 relied on. [Para 6

       (2) Court-fees -- question is to be decided on the averment of plaint -- it is a matter between plaintiff and State -- defendant cannot be allowed to obstruct the plaintiff.

       It is graphically clear that the averments in the plaint are to be taken note of and not that of the written statement. It is absolutely clear that it is the valuation as put forth by the plaintiff would be the valuation of the suit in the matter like this and the averments in the written statement are of no consequence.

       The Court-fees Act was passed not to arm a litigant with a weapon to technicality against his opponent but to secure revenue for the benefit of the State. It is not competent to a defendant in a suit to utilise the provisions of the Act at the appellate stage, not to safeguard the interests of the State, but to obstruct the plaintiff. AIR 1958 SC 245 followed. AIR 1918 PC 188 relied on. [para 6

       ¼1½ flfoy izfØ;k lafgrk] 1908 && /kkjk 115 && U;k;ky; Qhl esa deh dk iz‘u varoZfyr && mPp U;k;ky; dks iqujh{k.k esa gLr{ksi djus dh ‘kfDr ugha gSA

       tc ekeys esa U;k;ky; Qhl esa deh dk iz‘u varofyZr gks rc flfoy izfØ;k lafgrk dh /kkjk 115 ds v/khu mPp U;k;ky; dks gLr{ksi djus dh ‘kfDr ugha gSA ¿ iSjk 5

       okni= ij mfpr U;k;ky; Qhl lanÙk dh xbZ gS vFkok ugha] ;g izkFkfedr% oknh rFkk jkT; ds e/; dk iz‘u gSA flfoy izfØ;k lafgrk dh /kkjk 115 ds v/khu mPp U;k;ky; }kjk iz;qDr iqujh{k.k dh vf/kdkfjrk vfrfu;efu"Br% mlds [kaM ¼d½ ls ¼x½ }kjk ‘krZcan gSA , vkb vkj 1961 ,l lh 1299 vuqlfjrA 1996 ¼2½ fofk HkkLoj 194 voyafcrA ¿ iSjk 6

       ¼2½ U;k;ky; Qhl && iz‘u okni= ds izdFku ds vk/kkj ij fofuf‘pr fd;k tkuk gksxk && ;g oknh rFkk jkT; ds e/; dk fo"k; gS && izfroknh }kjk oknh dks vo:) fd;k tkuk vuqKkr ugha fd;k tk ldrkA

       ;g vR;ar Li"V gS fd okni= ds izdFkuksa ij /;ku fn;k tkuk gksrk gS] fyf[kr dFku ds izdFkuksa ij ughaA ;g fcYdqy Li"V gS fd oknh }kjk izLrkfor ewY;kadu gh ,sls fo"k; esa okn dk ewY;kadu gksxk rFkk fyf[kr dFku ds izdFku egRoghu gSaA

       U;k;ky; Qhl vf/kfu;e eqdnesckt dks vius fojks/kh dk rduhdh :i ls fojks/k djus ds fy, l‘kL= djus ds fy, ikfjr ugha fd;k x;k Fkk] vfirq jkT; ds Qk;ns ds fy, jktLo izkIr djus ds fy, fd;k x;k FkkA fdlh okn dk izfroknh vihyh izØe ij jkT; ds fgrksa dh j{kk ds fy, ugha vfirq oknh dks vo:) djus ds fy,] vf/kfu;e ds mica/kksa dk mi;ksx djus ds fy, l{ke ugha gSA , vkb vkj 1958 ,l lh 245 vuqlfjrA , vkb vkj 1918 ih lh 188 voyafcrA ¿ iSjk 6

ORDER

Misra, J. -- 1. Invoking the revisional jurisdiction of this Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure the defendants/petitioners have called in question the legal propriety of the order dated 28.10,98 passed by the learned Second Additional District Judge, Bilaspur in Civil Suit No. 22-A/95.

2. The facts lie in a narrow compass The non-applicant No. 1 as plaintiff instituted the aforesaid suit for specific performance of contract. It is averred in the plaint that an agreement for sale was entered into between the plaintiff and defendants on 11.11.94 in respect of the land situate at Khasra No. 757 in village Juna Bilaspur Patwari Circle No. 22. R.I. Circle, Bilaspur. As per the agreement the area of such Khasra has been given 7.830 sq. ft. and the rate per sq. ft. is fixed at Rs. 65/-. The applicant filed the written statement. After the written statement was filed certain issues were framed and Issue No. 3 related to valuation of the suit land. Initially, the plaintiff had valued the suit at Rs. 3,08,748/- and paid the court-fees thereon. As stated in the petition thereafter the plaintiff got the area demarcated and came to know that it was 6.426 sq. ft. and computed the value and filed an application for amendment for enhancement of the valuation of the suit land and paid the court-fee of Rs. 4,17,990/-

3. While the issue No.3 was taken up it was contended by the defendants that as per agreement for sale the area is 7,830 sq. ft. and therefore the plaintiff was under obligation to pay the court-fee on the valuation of the entire area and could not value it as he liked. The demarcation which was done by the plaintiff was also disputed.

4. The learned trial Judge accepted the valuation of the plaintiff and answered the Issue No.3 in favour of the plaintiff. The said order is the cause of grievance of the present petitioners.

5. I have heard Mr. Sanjay Agrawal learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr. Sanjay K. Agrawal, learned counsel for the non-applicant No. 1/plaintiff. It is submitted by Mr. Sanjay Agrawal, learned counsel that the plaintiff was obligated to pay the court-fee on the entire land and he could not have unilaterally changed the area.

Resisting the aforesaid submission Mr. Sanjay Kumar Agrawal, learned counsel, has contended that the valuation was in the domain of the plaintiff and as he had fixed the area after due demarcation he has paid the court-fees thereon and such an action of the plaintiff could not be found fault with Mr. Sanjay Agrawal has also submitted that when the question of deficit court fee is involved in the case the High Court has no power under section 115 of the CPC to interfere. To substantiate the aforesaid submission he has placed reliance on the decision rendered in the case of Sri Rathnavaramaraja v. Smt. Vimla, AIR 1961 SC 1299 and Lavkush Vastrakar and another v. Rameshwar Prasad Sahu, 1996 (2) Vidhi Bhasvar 194.

6. It is well established in law that the question of payment of court-fees has to be decided on the allegations made in the plaint. The Apex Court, in the case of Sathappa Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar, AIR 1958 SC 245 held as under:-

"The question of court-fees must be considered in the light of the allegations made in the plaint and its decision cannot be influenced either by the pleas in the written statement or by the final decision of the suit on the merits."

From the aforesaid enunciation of law it is graphically clear that the averments in the plaint are to be taken note of and not that of the written statement. It is absolutely clear that it is the valuation as put forth by the plaintiff would be the valuation of the suit in the matter like this and the averments in the written statement arc of no consequence. In the present case the plaintiff has valued the suit and computed the area at 6,426 sq. ft. and paid the court-fees thereon. In this context I may profitably refer to the decision rendered in the case of Rachappa Subrao Jadhav Desai v. Shidapp


















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