Doabia, J. -- 1. This letters patent appeal is directed against the order of a learned single Judge of this Court wherein he came to the conclusion that the writ petition bearing No. 295 of 1995 preferred by the present appellant is liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches. This opinion expressed by the learned single Judge is being assailed in the present appeal. In this appeal, additional grounds which have been taken be also noticed :

(i) that, the appellant - Mullo Bai was also a person interested and she was required to be given a separate notice;

(ii) that, it is also contended that a nonce as required under section 46 of the Madhya Pradesh Town Improvement Trust Act, 1960, was not served on the present appellant, and therefore, all subsequent proceedings taken are null and void.

2. With a view to appreciate the arguments raised by the learned counsel for the appellant, a brief history vis-a-vis these acquisition proceedings be noticed.

The Gwalior Town Improvement Trust framed a scheme. This was duly accorded sanction by the State Government. Notification under section 52 of the M.P. Town Improvement Trust, Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) was published. A copy of this has been placed on the file of writ petition as Annexure R/12. This is dated 1st January, 1972. Thereafter, further steps were taken under section 68 of the aforementioned Act and a notification under section 71 (I) of the aforementioned Act was also issued.

3. It be seen that when a notification has been issued under section 52 of the Act, then it is a conclusive proof that all procedural steps were duly taken. It would be apt to refer to a judgment given by the Supreme Court in Laxmichand v. Indore Improvement Trust, Indore and others, AIR 1975 SC 1303. In para 11, it was observed that" At any rate subsection (2) of section 52 puts a final seal of imprimatur on the scheme after publication of the sanction of the Government.

The submission, is, therefore, devoid of merit."

4. In this regard, it would also be apt to refer to a recent decision given by the Supreme Court of India in the case reported as M/s. Malwa Oil Mills and another v. State of M.P. and others, [1997 (1) JLJ 360 = JT 1996 (6) SC 44]. This very Act was under consideration before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court was of the view that in view of the provisions contained in section 71 of the Act, it would be presumed that all procedural steps were taken and the land would come to vest in the trust free from all encumbrances. Para 3 of the judgment is relevant and be noticed:

"A reading thereof would clearly indicate that on publication of the notification, the right, title and interest of the erstwhile owners stood divested and the land stood vested in the trust free from all encumbrances. As a consequence, the previous owners have no right or title to alienate the property to any third party. The sale made to the appellants in the aforesaid sale deed, therefore, is a void sale. It does not confer any right. It is also not in dispute that the scheme envisaged was for housing purpose. Unless the scheme is modified and duly published, no non-residential scheme can be brought up. The appellants came to be in possession of the land. It can at best be only illegal possession. The High Court gave a categorical finding that the appellants were not in possession and only sign board was put up in the property. Under these circumstances, they did not acquire any right to the property. ' , .

5. In view of the af9rementioned two judgments of the Supreme Court of India, there can be no dispute that when a notification under section 52 of the Act and further notification issued under section 71 of the Act, then it would be presumed that all procedural steps were duly taken by the authorities under the Act.

6. Independently of the above, it has come on the record that Birkha was the original owner. He preferred objections. These objections have been placed on the file of wr