1. Both these revisions arise from the impugned orders dated 30.10.1993 passed in Civil Suit No. 42-A/1984 (Civil Revision No. 578/93) and Civil Suit No. 40-A of 1984 (Civil Revision No. 584/93) by n Additional District Judge, Balaghat whereby the application for execution of the ex parte decrees passed in the said civil suits was held to be time-barred and was accordingly dismissed.

2. Decrees in Civil Suit No. 42-N84 & Civil Suit No. 40-N84 were passed in favour of the applicant whereby a mandatory injunction to the effect against the non-applicant/defendant" was passed that the non-applicant" would allot an MIG type house to the applicant whenever it is constructed, at the price, as prevailing for the said type of house in the year 1978. The ex-parte decrees to the above effect passed on 21st June, 1985 were sought to be executed by an applications for execution dated 20.1.1993, which were held to be time-barred and dismissed by the impugned-order.

3. It was urged before the executing Court that the judgment-debtors/non-applicant" had filed an application under Order 9 Rule 13 C.P.C. for setting-aside the ex parte decrees passed, as-above, which application was dismissed on 7.2.1987 by the trial Court and the misc appeal preferred in the High Court was also dismissed on 30.11.1992. Therefore, the period of limitation should be computed from 30.11.1992, i.e., the date of dismissal of the misc. appeal against the order dismissing the application for setting aside ex parte decree passed in the original suit. The contention was repelled by the impugned-order saying that the period of limitation could not be counted from 30.11.1992, which was passed in a co-lateral proceeding by way of an application under Order 9 Rule 13 C.P.C.

4. It is an admitted position of the case that the ex parte decree against the defendants/non-applicants was passed by the trial Court on 21.6.1985 and that it was a decree for mandatory injunction. Period of limit.1tion for enforcement of a decree granting a mandatory injunction is governed by Nticle-135 of the Limit.1tion Act and is provided as 3 years from the date of the decree or where a date is fixed for performance, such date. In the present case, on perusal of the copy of the decree, it is clear that no date of performance was specified in the original decree passed in the civil suit. Therefore, the date of the decree, i.e., 21st June, 1985 would be the date from which the limit.1tion would be computed. The argument of the learned counsel for the applicant is that the date ought to be computed from the date on which the appeal against an order dismissing application under Order 9 Rule 13 C.P.C. was passed and that date as mentioned above was 30.11.1.992. The above argument evidently cannot be accepted.

5. It is clear that the decree in the original suit was passed on 21.6.1985 and no appeal thereof had been filed. An application under Order 9 Rule-13 C.P.C. by the judgment debtors/present non-applicants was filed, which was dismissed by the trial Court and the appeal to the High Court was also dismissed• on 30.11.1992. Certainly, that application for setting aside the decree was not an appeal against the decree. It was a co-lateral proceeding and the period of limitation under Article-135 of the Limit.1tion Act, therefore, has to be computed from the date of' decree, i.e., 21.6.1985 and not from the date of dismissal of application i.e., 30.11.1992. In this connection, the case reported in AIR (37) 1950 SC 8 (Bhawanipore Banking Corpn. Ltd. v. Gauri Shankar Sharma) may he referred to. In that case, the judgment-debtor's application under Sec. 36, Bengal Money-lenders Act, for re-opening the preliminary mortgage decree was dismissed for default and a final decree was passed where after the judgment debtor made an application under Order 9 Rule 9 C.P.C. for restoration of proceedings under the Bengal Money-lenders Act, but that application as also the appeal against the said order of dismiss