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1995 JLJ 11
(FULL BENCH)
U.L. Bhat, C.J., M. V. Tamaskar and Rajeev Gupta, JJ.
Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Smt. Saraswati Bai and others
L.P.A. No. 10 of 1991; Decided on 28.9.1994.
(2) Civil P.C., 1908 --S. 2 (2) -- "decree" as defined under -- means a formal expression of an adjudication. ‘Decree" as defined in section 2 (2) of the C.P.C. 190R means a formal expression of an adjudication which, so far as regards the Court expressing it, conclusively determines the right, of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit and may be either preliminary or final. [Para 7
(3) Letters Patent (M.P.) -- CI. 10 -- word "judgment‘ as used under -meaning of. The word "judgment" as used in clause 10 of Letters Patent means a decision in an action whether final, preliminary or interlocutory which decides either wholly or partially, but conclusively in so far as the Court is concerned, the controversy which is the subject of the action. It does not include a decision which is on a matter of procedure, nor one which is ancillary to the action even though it may either imperil the ultimate decision or tend to make it effective. AIR 1952 Nag. 357 relied on. [Para 7
(4) Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 -- S. 100B -- award passed by the Tribunal -- is a judgment. An award passed by the Tribunal, whether it be one in favour of the claimant or against the claimant is one which decides wholly and conclusively in so far is the Tribunal is concerned, the controversy which is subject matter of action. The award which finally disposes of the claim application must be regarded as a judgment within the meaning of clause 10 of the Letters Patent. [Para 7
(5) Letters Patent (M.P.) -- Cl. 10 -- Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 -- S. 110D -- award passed by High Court in first appeal-- is a judgment -- Letters Patent appeal lies against such judgment.
The first appeal against such a judgment or award, when it is finally determined, also determines the controversy between the parties effectively and conclusively. Therefore, the decision of the learned single. Judge is also to be regarded as a judgment for the purpose of clause 10 of the Letters Patent and an appeal would lie to the Division Bench under clause 10. 1988 JLJ 86 and AIR 1988 MP 199 overruled. AIR 1970 Delhi 37, AIR 1972 P & H 65 and 1990 ACJ 550 relied on. AIR 1953 SC 357 and AIR 1965 SC 1442 followed. [Paras 7 & 8
¼1½ ‘‘kCn rFkk okD; && ‘‘kCn **fu.kZ;** && le>s tkus okyk izpfyr vFkZ] U;k;k/kh‘k }kjk fMØh vFkok vkns‘k ds vk/kkjksa ij dFku gSA ¿ iSjk 7À
¼2½ flfoy izfØ;k lafgrk] 1908 && /kkjk 2¼2½ && ds v/khu ;Fkk ifjHkkf"kr **fMØh** && vFkZ gS U;k;fu.kZ;u dh vkSipkfjd vfHkO;fDrA
flfoy izfØ;k lafgrk] 1908 dh /kkjk ¼2½ eas ;Fkk ifjHkkf"kr **fMØh** dk vFkZ U;k;fu.kZ;u dh vkSipkfjd vfHkO;fDr gS ftlesa tgk¡ rd U;k;ky; }kjk vfHkO;fDr dk laca/k gS] okn esa fooknxzLr fo"k;ksa esa ls leLr vFkok muesa esa fdlh ds ckjs esa i{kdkjksa ds vf/kdkjksa dk vo/kkj.k gksrk gSA ;g izkjafHkd Hkh gks ldrh gS vFkok vafre HkhA ¿ iSjk 7À
¼3½ ySVlZ isaVsaV ¼e-iz-½ && [kaM 10 && ds v/khu ;Fkk iz;qDr **fu.kZ;** && dk vFkZ gSA
ySVlZ isVsaV ds [kaM 10 esa ;Fkk iz;qDr ‘‘kCn **fu.kZ;** dk vFkZ gS fdlh dkjZokbZ esa dksbZ fofu‘p; && pkgs og vafre gks] izkjafHkd gks vFkok varoZrh&& ftlesa dkjZokbZ dk fooknxzLr fo"k; iw.kZr% vFkok Hkkxr% fdarq tgk¡ rd U;k;ky; dk laaca/k gS] vafrer% fofuf‘pr fd;k x;k gksA blesa ,slk fofu‘p; lfEefyr ugha gS tks izfØ;k ds fo"k; esa gks vkSj ,slk fofu‘p; Hkh lfEefyr ugha gS tks dkjZokbZ dk vuq"kaxh gks] Hkys&gh mlls vafre fofu‘p; ;k rks [krjs esa iM+rk gks vFkok dks izHkkoh curk gksA , vkb vkj 1952 ukxiqj 357 voyafcrA ¿ iSjk 7À
¼3½ eksVj ;ku vf/kfu;e] 1988 && /kkjk 110[k && vf/kdj.k }kjk ikfjr vf/kfu.kZ; && fu.kZ; gSA
vf/kdj.k }kjk ikfjr vf/kfu.kZ; && ;g pkgs nkosnkj ds i{k esa gks vFkok nkosnkj ds fo#) gks && og gS ftlesa dkjZokbZ dh fooknxzLr fo"k;oLrq] tgk¡ rd vf/kdj.k dk laca/k gS] iw.kZr% rFkk vafrer% fofuf‘pr dh xbZ gksA ,slk vf/kfu.kZ; ftlesa nkok&vkosnu dk vafrer% fuiVkjk fd;k x;k gks] ySVlZ isaVsaV ds [kaM 10 ds vFkkZarxZr fu.kZ; ekuk tkuk gksxkA ¿ iSjk 7À
¼5½ ySVlZ isaVsaV ¼e-iz-½ && [kaM 10 && eksVj;ku vf/kfu;e] 1939 && /kkjk 110?k && mPp U;k;ky; }kjk izFke vihy esa ikfjr vf/kfu.kZ; && fu.kZ; gS && ,sls fu.kZ; ds fo#) ySVlZ isVsaV vihy gksxhA
,sls fu.kZ; vFkok vf/kfu.kZ; ds fo#) izFke vihy }kjk mlds vafrer% vo/kkfjr gks tkus ij i{kdkjksa ds chp lafookn dk vo/kkj.k izHkkoh vkSj vafre :i ls gks tkrk gSA vr%] ySVlZ isVsaV ds [kaM 10 ds iz;kstu ds fy, fo}ku ,dy U;k;k/kh‘k ds fofu‘p; dk Hkh fu.kZ; ekuk tkuk gksxk vkSj [kaM 10 ds v/khu [kaM U;k;kihB ds le{k vihy gksxhA 1988 ts ,y ts 86 rFkk , vkb vkj 1988 e-iz- 199 myVs x,A , vkb vkj 1970 fnYyh 37] , vkb vkj 1972 iatkc vkSj gfj;k.kk 65 rFkk 1990 , lh ts 550 voyafcrA , vkb vkj 1953 ,l lh 357 rFkk , vkb vkj 1965 ,l lh 1442 vuqlfjrA ¿ iSjk 7 rFkk 8À
U.L. Bhat, CJ. -- 1. These appeals have been placed before" the Full Bench for determination of the question whether the appeals are maintainable under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent (Nagpur). We have heard learned counsel appearing for both sides as well as Shri Seth, Advocate who assisted as Amicus Curiae.
2. These appeals arise out of proceedings initiated before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal seeking compensation for death or injury suffered in motor vehicle accidents. In one case, the Tribunal dismissed the claim petition while in other cases, Tribunal passed awards directing payment of compensation specified in the awards to the claimants. The claimant in one case and the insurance Companies in the latter two cases filed appeals in this Court which were heard and dismissed by the learned Single Judges. These LPAs are filed against decisions of learned Single Judges. Registry has raised objections in all the cases regarding maintainability and they have been placed before the Full Bench.
3. Our attention is invited to two decisions of Division Bench of this Court. In Rajmata Vijayaraje Scindia and others v. Maharaja Madhavrao Scindia (1988 JLJ 86 = 1988 MPLJ 78) and Uttam Singh v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. (AIR 1988 MP 199 = 1988 (I) MPWN 85). The question which arose in the former decision was regarding maintainability of Letters Patent Appeal against the decisions of learned Single Judge in Miscellaneous Appeals against the order passed by the Trial Court under Order 59 Rules 1 and 2 C.P.C. The Court held that in view of sections 104 and 105 read with Order 43 Rule 1 C.P.C., letters patent Appeal under clause 10 of the Letters Patent is not competent. That decision has no relevance in the context of the present cases except that in paragraph 9 of the judgment. Dr. T.N. Singh, J. speaking for the Bench and dealing with appeals and other jurisdictions referred to two categories of cases and stated "Now, the second category of cases. Under section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act and section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act, an appeal against an 'award' passed by the 'Commissioner' in one case and the 'Tribunal' in the other case lies to . High Court'. Even if the High Court rules provide for such appeals being heard by a single Judge, the judgment or order passed by such Judge in exercise of appellate jurisdiction of the High Court will not create a right of a second appeal merely because the Letters Patent contemplate an intra-court appeal. Once the appellate power is exercised by the High Court, whether by a Single Bench or a Division Court, the power contemplated under section 30 Workmen's Compensation Act, in one case and under section 110D of Motor Vehicles Act is exhausted.
The matter dealt with in the above observation did not really arise for consideration in the case. However, in the latter decision, the same Division Bench merely followed the above observations and held that L.P.A. would not lie. It was on the strength of these decisions that the Registrary has raised the objection regarding maintainability.
4. It may be necessary in this connection to advert to the relevant provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act 1939. Section 110 of the Ad empowered the State Government to constitute Motor Accident Claims Tribunals for purposes of adjudicating upon claims for compensation. Section 110A dealt with application for compensation. Sec. 110-B stated inter-alia, that the Claims Tribunal after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard and holding enquiry into the claim may make an award determining the amount of compensation which appears to it to be just and specifying the person or persons to whom compensation is to be paid. Section 110D stated that subject to the provisions of sub-section (2) any person aggrieved by an award of the Claims Tribunal, may within 90 days from the date of award, prefer an appeal to the High Court. Where the Tribunal dismissed the claim or allowed it to any extent, the s
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