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1993 Supreme(MP) 356
1993 JLJ 663
(FULL BENCH)
S.K. Dubey, R.C. Lahoti and Sacheedra Dwivedi, JJ.
Usha Narawariya (Dr.) v. State of M.P. and another
M.P. No. 1278 of 1993; Decided on 22.6.1993.
Arun Mishra for petitioner; C.S. Dixit, Deputy Government Advocate for State; R.D Jain and S.K. Jain for respondent No.2; N.P. Mittal for Union of India.
Headnote:(1) Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 -- Ss, 14 and 15 -- word "recruitment" used under --. suggests earlier part of the process which cu/minutes in appointment.
Recruitment is an earlier part of the process which culminates in appointment. Selection is pan of recruitment process and precedes appointment. Notifying the vacancies, inviting applications, their scrutiny, finalisation of list of such eligible candidates as would be put to test, their written or oral test and interview, selection and approval for appointment, are all different steps in the process of recruitment. So it would not have made any difference if the Preamble to the Administrative Tribunals Act and sections 14 and 15 thereof would have used the term "recruitment" merely and avoided the use of the words "matters concerning recruitment" inasmuch as "matters concerning recruitment" would have been deemed to be included in ‘recruitment‘ ‘itself‘. AIR 1993 SCW 67 and (1990) 13 ATC 708 followed [Paras 20 to 21
(2) Constitution of India --Art. 323A --Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 -- enactment of Tribunals Act -- object is to relieve High Courts of mounting backlog of cases -- it is a remedial Act to be construed in widest operation.
The Tribunals are meant to be substitutes for High Courts for relieving them of mounting backlog of cases and assuring quick settlement of service disputes in the interest of public servants. The Tribunals Act is a remedial piece of legislation. In construing a remedial act, the Court ought to give widest operation which the language of the Act will permit.(1985) 4 SCC 451) and AIR 1987 SC 386 followed. [Para 22
(3) Constitution of India -- Art. 323A -- phruseologhy used under -- does not permit its meaning being confined to "in- service" persons merely.
Clause (1) of Art. 323 A having provided for establishment of Administrative Tribunals, clause (2) thereof confers power on Parliament to make such laws as would make the provisions fur: (i) jurisdiction and powers or the Tribunal. and (ii) exclusion of jurisdiction over all the Courts other than Supreme Court under Art. 136, Clause (3) gives the provisions of Art. 323-A an over riding did over all other laws as also any other provision or the Constitution. The phraseology used does not permit its meaning being confined to "in-service." persons merely. [Para 23
(4) Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 – Ss. 14, 15 and 19 – Provision under S. 19 is procedural only – it does not limit scope of substantive provisions contained in Ss. 14 and 15.
Section 19 is merely a proceedrual or machinery provision which cannot be pressed into service for limiting down the scope of substantive provisions contained in sections 14 and 15 of the Tribunals Act. The Rules framed under the Act in exercise of delegated legislative power conferred by the Act itself can also not be utilised for construing the provisions of the Act and deterring the length and breadth of the various substantive provisions contained in the Act. 1992 – 1 MPJR 437 and 1989 MPLJ 255 overruled. M.P. No. 166/99 distinguished. AIR 1993 SCW 67, (1990) 13 A TC 708 and 1992 – VSLR 341 followed. 1988- 56 FLR 696, AIR 1987 AP 230 AND 1987 LIC 104 relied on. [ Para 28
R.C. Lahoti, J. 1.-- This common order answers the common reference made in M.P. No. 1278/92 (Dr. Usha Nanvariya v. State of M.P. & Ors. ) and M.P. No. 1335/92 (Jairam Soni v. M.P. Public Service Commission & others). A Division Bench consisting of S.K. Dubey and S.K. Chawla, JJ. formed an opinion that there was a cleavage of opinion in two Division Bench decision of this Court, namely. M.P. No. 1060/91 (Man Mohan Singh v. State of M.P. & ors.) decided on 7.2.92 at Gwalior and M.P. No.166/1991 (Betalsingh Mahore v. State of M.P.& ors.) decided on 28.4.92 at Gwalior (1992-I MPJR 437) and made a reference to the Hon 'ble Chief Justice who has been pleased to constitute this Full Bench for resolving the conflict in the abovesaid two Division Bench decisions.
2. A reference in brief to the facts of the two cases is proposed to be made as it would enable acquiring firm gripover the controversy arising for decision.
3. In M.P.No.1278/92, in response to an advertisement issued by the M.P. Public Service Commission, (hereinafter 'the Commission' for short) the petitioner Dr. Usha Narwariya had applied for appointment by selection to the post of Assistant Professor in Zoology. She was given a roll number and allowed to appear in the written examination. However, she was excluded from the zone of consideration for her having passed M.Sc. in Bio-Science.
4. In M.P. No. 1335/92, pursuant to an advertisement issued by the Commission, the petitioner Jairam Soni had applied for appearing in the Stale Services Preliminary Examination, 1992 arranged for selecting suitable candidates for appointment to the State Administrative Services. The petitioner and a few others around 300 could not appear at the preliminary examination held at Gwalior on 19.7.92 allegedly because of dislocation in railway services consequent to a sudden strike by railway employees at Jhansi resulting in belated arrival of the train at Gwalior by which time the examination was already over.
5. At the hearing before the Division Bench, the learned counsel for the respondent - Commission erected a stumbling block to the maintainability and entertainability of the petitions submitting that section 14 read with section 28 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Tribunals Act' for short), excluded the jurisdiction of the High Court and the appropriate forum before which the two petitioners should have raised their grievances was of the State Administrative Tribunal duly established and functioning in the State o( Madhya Pradesh with a Bench seat at Gwalior. The contention of the learned counsel for the Commission was that the words "recruitment or matters concerning recruitment" used in clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Tribunals Act include the process of selection beginning with the issuance of advertisement and ending with the preparation of selection list for appointment of the candidates. In support of his contention, the learned counsel placed reliance on Supreme Court decisions in Union of India v. Deepchand (1992 v. S.L.R. 341),A.P. Public Service Commission, Hyderabad v. V. Sarat Chandra (1990 -XIII A.T.C. 708); Sudhanshu Tripathi v. Union of India (1988-56 FLR 696) and an unreported Division Bench decision of this Court in the case on Man Mohan Singh (supra)
6. The learned counsel for the petitioners, on the other hand, placed reliance on Betalsingh Mahore'scase (supta), the Chairman, Railway Recruitment Board Madras v. S.Ruban Peter (1990 LIC 1759) and submitted deriving assistance from Vijay Singh Jadon v. State of M.P. (1989 MPLJ 255) that matters relating to 'pre-recruitment stage' cropping up for consideration at the instance of persons who are not 'in-service' do not lie within the jurisdiction of the State Administration Tribunal, as 'recruitment and matters concerning recruitment' occurring in sections 14 and 15 of the Act were circumscribed in their application and covered the persons who had been appointe
