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1992 Supreme(MP) 355
1992 JLJ 458
D.M. Dharmadhikari and S.K. Chawla, JJ.
Laxmi Bai and another v. Nagaram Khilawandas
S.A. No. 237 of 1988; Decided on 29.6.1992.
Headnote:(1) Limitation Act, 1963 -- S. 5 -- application for condonation of delay rejected by first appellate Court -- remedy is to invoke writ jurisdiction of High Court under Art. 227 of the Constitution. AIR 1987 MP 120 and AIR 1984 Orissa 230 (FB) relied on. [Para 3
(2) Constitution of India -- Art. 227 -- application under S. 5, Limitation Act rejected by first appellate Court -- remedy available is to invoke writ jurisdiction of the High Court. AIR 1987 MP 120 and AIR 1984 Orissa 230 (FB) relied on. [Para 3
(3) Constitution of India -- Art. 227 -- second appeal or civil revision found incompetent -- cannot be converted into writ petition by Single Judge of High Court suo motu -- nor can be heard by him alone.
The opinion cannot be accepted that a Single Judge, after permitting conversion of memo of appeal or revision into a writ petition can hear and dispose of the case. Such a course is impermissible under the High Court Rules framed for disposal of a writ petition under Art. 227 of the Constitution. The petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India under the High Court Rules can only be heard and decided by a Division Bench of the Court. 1986 JLJ 600 overruled. AIR 1980 SC 892 followed. S.A. No. 402 and 441 of 1988 confirmed. [Para 6
(4) Civil P.C., 1908 -- Ss. 100 and 115 -- second appeal or civil revision dismissed as incompetent -- appellant or applicant throughout litigating within time -- may be allowed to prefer writ petition under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India. [Paras 8 & 9
¼1½ ifjlhek vf/kfu;e] 1963 && /kkjk 5 && foyac ds fy, ekQh dk vkosnu izFke vihy U;k;ky; }kjk [kkfjt fd;k x;k && mipkj lafo/kku ds vuq- 227 ds v/khu mPp U;k;ky; dh fjV vf/kdkfjrk dk voyac ysuk gSA , vkb vkj 1987 e/; izns‘k 120 rFkk , vkb vkj 1984 mM+hlk 230 ¼iw.kZ U;k;ihB½ voyafcrA ¿ iSjk 3À
¼2½ Hkkjr dk lafo/kku && vuq- 227 && ifjlhek vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 5 ds v/khu vkosnu izFke vihy U;k;ky; }kjk [kkfjt fd;k x;k && miyC/k mipkj mPp U;k;ky; dh fjV vf/kdkfjrk dk voyac ysuk gSA , vkb vkj 1987 e/; izns‘k 120 rFkk , vkb vkj 1984 mM+hlk 230 ¼iw.kZ U;k;ihB½ voyafcrA ¿ iSjk 3À
¼3½ Hkkjr dk lafo/kku && vuq- 227 && f}rh; vihy vFkok flfofy iqujh{k.k v{ke i;k x;k && mPp U;k;ky; ds ,dy U;k;k/kh‘k }kjk Loiszj.kk ls fjV ;kfpdk esa laifjofrZr ugha fd;k tk ldrk && u mlds vdsys ds }kjk lquk gh tk ldrk gSA
;g jk; Lohdkj ugha dh tk ldrh fd dksbZ ,dy U;k;k/kh‘k vihy vFkok iqujh{k.k ds Kkiu dk fjV ;kfpdk esa laifjorZu vuqKkr djus ds i‘pkr~ ekeys dks lqu ldrk gS vkSj mldk fuiVkjk dj ldrk gSA ,slk ekxZ] lafo/kku ds vuq- 227 ds v/khu fdlh fjV ;kfpdk ds fuiVkjs ds fy, fojfpr mPp U;k;ky; ds fu;eksa ds v/khu vuqKs; ugha gSA Hkkjr ds lafo/kku ds vuq- 227 ds v/khu ;kfpdk] mPp U;k;ky; ds fu;eksa ds v/khu] dsoy U;k;ky; dh fdlh [kaM U;k;ihB }kjk lquh vkSj fofuf‘pr dh tk ldrh gSA 1986 ts ,y ts 600 myVk x;kA , vkb vkj 1980 ,l lh 892 vuqlfjrA f}rh; vihy Ø- 402 ,oa 441 lu~ 1988 iq"VA ¿ iSjk 6À
¼4½ flfoy izfØ;k lafgrk] 1908 && /kkjk 100 rFkk 115 && f}rh; vihy vFkok iqujh{k.k v{ke gksus ls [kkfjt fd;k x;k && vihykFkhZ vFkok vkosnd dh eqdnesckth vk|ksikar le; ds Hkhrj && Hkkjr ds lafo/kku ds vuqPNsn 227 ds v/khu fjV ;kfpdk izLrqr djus ds fy, vuqKkr fd;k tkuk pkfg,A ¿ iSjk 8 ,oa 9À
D.M. Dharmadhikari, J. -- 1. A common order is being passed in this Second Appeal, Second Appeal No. 402 of 1988 (Ram Sahay v. Rambahoran) and Second Appeal No. 441 of 1988 (Maharani and others v. Phoolrani) as a common reference has been made by the learned Single Judge, Hon. S.K. Seth, J., to resolve the conflict which has arisen due to his own dissenting opinion and the one expressed in Civil Revision No. 63 of 1980 (Maharnosh Marfitia v. Paras Kumar Gangwal), decided on 18.6.86, on one side and the opinion of Hon. Dr. T.N. Singh, J. at Gwalior Bench of this Court in a decision reported in Anwer v. Wahidan (1986 JLJ 600) on the other.
2. In regular appeals under section 96 of the Civil Procedure Code filed by the appellants in the lower appellate Court, applications under section 5 of the Limitation Act for extension of time in filing the appeals were filed. The first appellate Court rejected the applications for extension of time and consequently dismissed the appeals as barred by time. Against the orders dismissing the appeals, the appellants presented the present second appeals under section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code.
3. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants in these cases do not dispute the legal position that against the order refusing to extend the period of time for filing the appeals under section 5 of the Limitation Act and the consequent dismissal of the appeals being barred by time, the second appeal is not maintainable, because appeal is competent only against the decree and not the order. Learned counsel also does not dispute the position that in view of the local amendment in the State of M.P. to section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code, a revision is also not maintainable against such an order, because the valuation of the claim in appeal is less than Rs. 20,000/-. The only remedy available to the aggrieved party against the order rejecting the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act is, therefore, to invoke writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. See: Bal Kishan and others v. Tulsa Bai and another (AIR 1987 MP 120). Also see Ainthu Charan Purida v. Sitaram Laxminarayan Firm and another (AIR 1984 Orissa 230-F.B.).
4. The learned Single Judge, Hon. Dr. T.N. Singh, J. at Gwalior Bench in the decision of Anwer v. Wahidan (supra) took a view that an appeal or revision under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code filed against such an order can be allowed to be converted into a writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution and can also be heard and disposed of by a Single Judge. The learned Single Judge, Hon. Dr. T.N. Singh, J. took a note of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Vishesh Kumar v. Shanti Prusad (AIR 1980 SC 892); but distinguished the same. In the order of reference made in these cases, Hon. S.K. Seth, J. has expressed a dissenting opinion. The opinion is that conversion of memo of revision or appeal into a writ petition is not permissible in view of the clear pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Vishesh Kumar (supra) and, in any case, the High Court Rules, framed for regulating the procedure for a writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, do not permit a Single Judge to decide a writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution, even if entertained by him after conversion of memo of appeal or revision into a writ petition.
5. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the appellants, who tried to support the opinion expressed by Hon. Dr. T.N. Singh, J. An alternative argument has been advanced that, in any case, the Single Judge, before whom either a memo of revision or second appeal is filed against such an order, rejecting the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act, is competent to direct conversion of the memo of appeal or revision into a writ petition and to that extent, the jurisdiction of Single Judge cannot be questioned. Having our due consideration to the conflicting opi
