B.C. Varma, Ag. C.J. -- 1. In this appeal u/S. 39 of the Arbitration Act against the judgment making the award of the arbitrator the rule of the Court and consequent decree, the only question agitated relates to the award of interest on the principal amount found due to the respondent.

2. On 13th August, 1986, the Civil Court in a pending suit between the parties, appointed Shri V. Balasubramanyam, Additional Divisional Railway Manager (Technical), South-Eastern Railway, Bilaspur the sole arbitrator. Claims were laid before the arbitrator who by its award held the respondent entitled to Rs. 1,19,926/- in full and final settlement of the various claims in suit. In addition, a sum of Rs. 1,60,749/- has been awarded towards the full and final settlement of claim of interest up to the date of the making of the award. Some small amounts were also awarded towards the incidental expenses and other clerkage charges. •Then, while concluding, the arbitrator awarded simple interest at Rs. 12/- per cent per annum on a sum of Rs. 2,80,675/- (Le., the total sum awarded) from the date of award till payment.

3. When the award was filed in the Court, the appellant objected to the award of Rs. 1,60,749/- as interest alleging it to be arbitrary and outside the scope of reference. Award of future interest was also objected to. The respondent inter alia pleaded that the objections raised by the appellant were barred by limitation. This objection as to the limitation found favour with the Court and the objections were, therefore, dismissed as barred by limitation. After rejecting the objections, the Court, vide the impugned judgment, upheld the award of Rupees 2,80,675/together with future interest thereon at the rate of Rs. 12/- per cent per annum.

4. The finding that the objections were barred by limitation cannot be assailed. The award was filed in Court on 7.3.1987 and the parties took notice of the award on 16.6.1987. The objections to the award were filed by the appellant on 3.8.1987, i.e., admittedly beyond the period of thirty days. No application was made to condone the delay, even if such application can be held to be tenable. The objection to set aside the award has, therefore, been rightly held barred by limitation.

5. Shri Anoop Choudhary, learned counsel for the appellant-Union of India, however, submitted that even if the objections taken by the appellant to the award made by the arbitrator are held barred by limitation, the Court ought to have considered that the arbitrator had no jurisdiction to award interest and in no case could interest pendente lite be awarded by the arbitrator, and, therefore, should have set aside at least the part of the award directing payment of interest. This argument appears to be based upon the effect of and consequences flowing from the terms of Section 17 of the Arbitration Act. Section 17 of the Act provides that if the Court sees no cause to set aside the award, it shall, after the time for making an application to set aside the award has expired or when an application to set aside the award is refused, proceed to pronounce judgment according to the award. A Division Bench of the Kerala High Court, in P. Mulji and Sons v. K.P. Exporting Co., AIR 1976 Ker 3, considered the effect of Section 17 of the Arbitration Act and observed that the requirement is that the Court has to be satisfied that there is no ground to set aside the award and if so satisfied, to pass a decree. An order to set aside an award need not necessarily be on an application by it party. But such an order can as well be contained in the order passed under S. 17. Such suo motu power of the Court to invalidate the award, however, can be exercised only if there is any patent illegality or void ness or the award directs a party to do an act which is prohibited by law. If such illegality is not patent but requires an enquiry to find that out, the Court may not be justified in exercising is suo motu jurisdiction. [See also minority judg