R.C. Lahoti, J. -- 1. The defendant/tenant has come up in appeal aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court directing his ejectments from the suit accommodation, non-residential one, under section 12 (1) (b) and (f) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'). The scope of the hearing in appeal stands circumscribed, as will be noticed hereafter.

Admittedly, the appellant was a tenant in the suit accommodation owned by the plaintiff/respondent. The trial Court dismissed the suit for eviction. On appeal preferred by the landlord/respondent, the lower appellate Court allowed the appeal and held that grounds for ejectment, both under clauses (b) and (f) of sub-section (1) of section 12 of the Act, were made out on evidence.

3. The appeal was preferred on 2.7.77 However, the decree was already executed and the possession delivered to the plaintiff / respondent on 20-3-77.

4. On 21-8-78, when the appeal came up for hearing on the question of admission, this Court passed a detailed order holding that the finding as to the availability of ground for ejectment under section 12(1) (f) of the Act was not open to challenge. The appeal was admitted for hearing parties only on the question whether there was no sub-letting as contemplated by clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 12 of the Act. This Court opined that in view of the finding as to the availability of ground under clause (f) having been confirmed, the decree for eviction would stand, nevertheless availability of ground under clause (b) was being taken up for consideration in second appeal because in the event the finding being reversed on that issue, the tenant appellant would be entitled to compensation under section 12 (6) of the Act. In short, this Court was definitely of the opinion that the decree for eviction was not open to challenge in second appeal and the only effect of admitting the appeal for hearing would be on the entitlement of the tenant to compensation under section 12 (6) of the Act.

4. On 5-4-91, the tenant / appellant has moved two applications before this Court one, seeking amendment in the written statement so as to take a plea that the alleged requirement of the plaintiff had come to an end on account of subsequent events, also that the plaintiff/landlord had other alternative accommodation available now to him, the same having come into possession of the plaintiff during the pendency of the appeal, which accommodation would satisfy the requirement of the plaintiff, if there be any; and the other, under Order 26, Rule 9 C.P.C., seeking an inspection of the suit accommodation by appointment of a Commissioner to bring on record the fact that the accommodation was still lying vacant unutilised for the purpose for which the eviction was sought. A plea has also been attempted to be brought on record that the alleged delivery of possession on 20.3.77 in execution of the decree under appeal was false, also illegal and hence liable to be set aside.

5. The learned counsel for the appellant has forcefully submitted relying on M/s. Variety Emporium v. R.M. Mohd. Ibrahim (AIR 1985 SC 207), Hasmatirai v. Raghunath Prasad (AIR 1981 SC 1711), P. Vyankateshwar v. Motor and General Traders (AIR 1975 SC 1409), Tarabai v. Kubrabai (1981 MPRCJ, SN 153), Onkarlal v. Firm Rambhajan Ramniwas (1983 MPRCJ SN 160), and, Baburam v. A.D. Dehradun (AIR 1983 All 170 - DB) that this Court should notice the subsequent events. True it is that an appellate Court is not only entitled but is duty bound to take note of such subsequent events as have a material bearing on right to relief of the parties and the decree under appeal. But the question arises - until when? whether before the decree has achieved a finality or even thereafter?

6. The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, as it stood prior to the Amendment Act of 1976 (No. 104 of 1976) permitted a second appeal being heard fully once the Court was convinced that one or more