2005 Supreme(MP) 1125
HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
Dipak Misra, J.
F.A.Construction
Versus
Narmada Valley Development Department
Writ Petition 1066 of 2005 Of
Decided On : Nov 17,2005
P.N.DUBEY, R.P.AGRAWAL, R.UPADHYA,
( 1. ) IN this batch of writ petitions the centripodal issue being same and the question of law that emerges for consideration being similar it was heard analogously and is disposed of by this singular order. For the sake of clarity and convenience the facts in W. P. No. 1063/2005 are adumbrated herein.
( 2. ) THE petitioner, a registered partnership firm, is engaged in doing the job of civil and irrigation works. It entered into an agreement with the Narmada Valley Development Authority (presently known as Narmada Valley Development Department) vide agreement No. 2/dl/2002-2003 for construction of right bank main canal, Group-1. RD 16 KM to RD 20 KM. After acceptance of the tender, as pleaded, work order was issued in favour of the petitioner and thereafter, the petitioner approached the respondents for providing mark-out and handing over the site for commencement of the work but due to non-response of the respondents the petitioner was compelled to file an application under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for brevity the Act) before the learned District Judge, Jabalpur. ( 3. ) IT is contended in the petition that time had never been the essence of contract which is visible from the conduct of the respondents and further the delay in execution of the work was on the ground of the reasons which are exclusively attributable to the respondents. The hurdle created in smooth execution of the work was beyond the control of the petitioner as the petitioner-firm did not contravene any of the stipulations of the agreement. Despite the aforesaid obtaining situation the Executive Engineer of the respondents threatened to encash the security deposit, confiscate the entire plant and machinery including the construction material installed/kept at the site alleging that there had been breach of the agreement on the part of the petitioner. It is put forth that threat was given to appropriate the earnest money deposit which was otherwise refundable to the petitioner. The respondents deducted 5% of the amount towards additional security deposit at the time of payment of each running bill. Because of this threat the petitioner preferred an application under Section 9 of the Act praying therein that the respondents be restrained from encashing the security deposit, taking possession and selling of the plant and machinery as also the material stored at the site. A further prayer was also made restraining the respondents from appropriating additional security lying with the petitioner-firm as earnest money deposit. The learned District Judge passed an ad interim injunction directing the parties to maintain status quo. The respondents entered contest and after completion of the pleadings the learned District Judge dismissed the application which formed the subject-matter of MJC No. 22/2004. The impugned order dated 22-2-2004 has been brought on record as Annexure P-3. It is pleaded that the learned District Judge dismissed the application on the foundation that there is a statutory bar of taking cognizance of the dispute in view of the language employed under Section 20 of the M. P. Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983 (in short the 1983 Act ).
( 4. ) IT is not in dispute that the petitioner had already submitted his claims for adjudication as required under Clause 4. 3. 29. 2 of the agreement before Superintending engineer of the respondents and the final verdict is awarded.
After adjudication of the claim by the said Authority under the aforesaid clause of the agreement the petitioner has the right to refer the dispute under Section 17-A of the 1983 Act to the Arbitration Tribunal constituted under Section 9 of the aforesaid Statute. A reference has been made to Section 17-A of the 1983 Act which debars the Tribunal to pass an order of injunction stay or attachment before the award is passed. In view of the aforesaid the learned District Judge expressed the opinion that it has no jurisdiction to pass the order of re