( 1. ) THIS second appeal has been filed by the appellants/defendants being aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 12-4-2002, passed in Civil Appeal no. 25-A/2000 by the First Additional District Judge, Damoh wherein the judgment and decree dated 14-11-1996, passed in Civil Suit No. l-A/96 by IIIrd civil Judge, Class II, Damoh has been affirmed and the appellants have been ordered to be evicted from the tenanted premises on the grounds mentioned in section 12 (1) (a) and 12 (1) (f) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961.

( 2. ) THIS appeal was admitted on the following two substantial questions of law:-

" (1) Whether the statutory protection provided in sub-section (3)of Section 12 of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act was available to the appellants and as such the First Appellate Court erred in holding the ground of eviction provided under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 12 of M. P. Accommodation Control Act, available to the respondents, for appellants eviction ?

(2) Whether the Courts below erred in not treating available alternative accommodation, suitable for the business of Mukesh, the third son of respondent No. 1 ?"

( 3. ) IN respect of the first substantial question of law, it is urged by the learned Counsel for the appellants that the Trial Court had dismissed the suit as far as the ground under Section 12 (1) (a) of the Act is concerned and, therefore, the Appellate Court on the same set of facts could not have decreed the suit on that ground. Quite apart from the above, the appellants have filed an application la. No. 13952/2008 under Section 13 (1) of the Act for condonation of delay in depositing the rent and have submitted that as no arrears of rent remain outstanding, the decree under the ground stated in Section 12 (1) (a) of the Act be set aside. It is submitted that though admittedly, on the date the suit was filed by the respondents/landlords, the appellants were in arrears of rent, but, the arrears were deposited by them on various dates before the Trial Court and, therefore, though the Trial Court recorded a finding that the appellants were in arrears of rent, it rejected the suit filed by the respondents on this ground, however, the First Appellate Court, on examining the facts and documents on record, found that the appellants had been inconsistent in depositing the rent and had not been depositing the same by the 15th of each succeeding month and had not filed any application for condonation of delay as required by Section 13 (1) of the Act and, therefore, allowed the suit as filed by the landlord on the ground mentioned in Section 12 (1) (a) of the Act. Before this Court, the appellants have not disputed the fact that they have committed such defaults in depositing the rent and have also admitted the fact that they did not file any application for condonation of delay before the Appellate Court along with the memo of appeal. However, it is submitted by the learned Counsel for the appellants that they have filed I. A. No. 13952/08 for condonation before this court and this Court has the power to condone the delay and has prayed that the interim application filed before this Court for condonation be allowed and the appellants eviction under Section 12 (1) (a) of the Act be set aside.

( 4. ) PER contra, the learned Counsel, appearing on behalf of the respondents, submits that the appellants have committed as many as nine defaults in depositing the rent and not complied with the provisions of Section 13 (1) of the Act. It is also submitted that in spite of the fact of committing such defaults in depositing the rent, the appellants did not file any application for condonation of delay in depositing the rent before the Appellate Court and in such circumstances LA No. 13952/08 filed by the appellants before this Court for condoning the default committed by them since September, 1993 deserves to be dismissed and the eviction of the appellants on the ground under Section 12 (1) (a) of