1977 Supreme(MP) 123
High Court Of Madhya Pradesh
Shiv Dayal, C.J.
RAMARAO MAROTIRAO
Versus
SHANTIBAI MADHORAO
Decided On : Nov 24,1977
N.S.KALE, P.R.Padhye,
Headnote:(1) Appeal – judgment ill appeal – judgment of trial Court being set aside-matters requiring consideration in such appellate order-reasons given by the trial Court must be discussed.
Where the appellate Court sets aside the judgment passed by the trial Court three things must appear from the judgment of the appellate Court –
(i) That it applied its mind to the reasons given by the trial Court;
(ii) That it was present to its mind that the trial Court had the advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses which the appellate Court itself did not have; and
(iii) Disagreeing with the trial Court.
If this is not done it must be said that the order of the appellate Court is contrary to law. The appellate Court has the undoubted jurisdiction to reappreciate the oral evidence and reach a finding contrary to that arrived at by the trial Court, but this it can do only if its order satisfies the above three conditions. AIR 1951 SC 120, AIR 1960 SC 115, AIR 1929 PC 15, 1947 AC 484 and AIR 1949 PC 32 relied on. AIR 1972 SC 1716, AIR 1941 Mad. 393, AIR 1972 Orissa 28, AIR 1975 Patna 192 and 1960 JLJ 348 referred to.
(Para 9)
(2) Civil P.C., 1908 – S. 115 – manner in which decision arrived at illegal-interference may be made.
It is one thing to say that the High Court cannot reappreciate the evidence and substitute its finding of fact, while exercising revisional jurisdiction but it is quite another to say that the High Court has no jurisdiction to interfere in revision even when a subordinate Court has acted in contravention of the law. Under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the High Court has jurisdiction to set aside an order of a subordinate Court, if it exercised its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. These words do not refer to the decision arrived at by the subordinate Court but they refer to the manner ill which it is reached. AIR 1971 SC 2324 relied on.
(Para 12)
( 1. ) IN the suit instituted by the revision-petitioners, April 2, 1968, was fixed for evidence of both the parties. On that date, the defendants counsel applied for adjournment on the ground that Shantibai and Ganpatrao were not able to attend the Court because of illness. Seven witnesses for the plaintiffs were present. The trial Court rejected the application for adjournment and at that stage counsel for the defendants reported no instructions and retired. The trial Court forthwith recorded evidence of the plaintiffs witnesses including the plaintiff himself and closed the case. On April 6, 1968, the trial Court delivered its judgment and passed a decree in favour of the plaintiffs against the defendants.
( 2. ) THE defendants made an application under Order 9, Rule 13, Civil procedure Code, for setting aside the ex parte decree. That was resisted by the plaintiffs. The trial Court rejected it by its order dated March 3, 1969.
( 3. ) THE defendants appealed. The learned Additional District Judge, raipur, allowed the appeal and set aside the ex parte decree.
( 4. ) WHEN this revision was initially laid before me for hearing parties, a preliminary question was raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the application under Order 9, Rule 13, Civil Procedure Code, was not competent inasmuch as the defendants counsel appeared on April 2, 1968, when the case was called on for hearing. The ex parte decree was, therefore, not under Order 17, Rule 2, Civil Procedure Code but it was under Order 17, rule 3 of the Code. Since the question was of every day occurrence, I formulated certain question for decision by a larger Bench. That reference was answered by a Bench of five Judges. See Ramrao v. Shantibai (1977 M PL J 364 = 1977 J L J 147. ).
( 5. ) THUS, in view of the opinion of the Full Bench, the preliminary question raised by Shri Padhye must be decided against the petitioners.
( 6. ) SHRI Padhye now urges that the order passed by the appellate Court is not in accordance with law. The learned Additional District Judge exercised his jurisdiction illegally, i. e. in contravention of the law. It is urged that the trial Court, after marshalling the evidence of both the parties, gave its reasons why it did not believe Shantibai (A. W. 1), Ganpatrao (A. W. 2)and Ramkrishna Khandelwal Dentist. The trial Judge also discussed the evidence of Ramrao (NA. W. 1) and Suraj Bali (N A. W. 2 ).
( 7. ) ON a perusal of the order passed by the trial Court, I find that it gave its reasons elaborately why it did not believe the defendant-applicants evidence. But what the learned Additional District Judge did was just to indicate briefly the points deposed to by Shantibai, Dr. Ramkrishna Khandelwal and Ganpatrao and also by Ramrao. However, it does not at all appear from its order that it considered the reasons given by the trial Court for disbelieving the applicants evidence. It does not appear from the appellate order whether the learned Additional District Judge even perused the order of the trial Court at all or not.
( 8. ) THE question that arises is whether the appellate Court, can in the matter of appreciating oral evidence, completely shut its eyes as to what the trial Court said, and arrive at a contrary finding.
( 9. ) IT is a proposition well settled that the appellate Court is bound to consider the reasons on which the trial Court arrived at findings of fact. And, in case, after appreciating the oral evidence produced by the parties, the appellate Court come to a different conclusion, though bearing in mind that it has not enjoyed the opportunity of seeing and hearing the witnesses, it can certainly record its own findings holding that those reached by the trial Court were erroneous. In such a case, three things must appear from the judgment of the appellate Court: (1) That it applied its mind to the reasons given by the trial Court; (2) that it was present to its mind that the trial Court had the advantage of seeing and hea