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High Court Of Madhya Pradesh
J. S. Verma and U. N. Bhachawat, JJ.
HUKUMSINGH MAJBOOTSINGH CHAUHAN
Versus
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
Decided On : Apr 30,1979
(2) Constitution of India - Arts. 309, 310 and 311-doctrine of pleasure -is controlled by Article 311-common law rights under law of master and servant-how far available.
The power contained in Article 309 is 'subject to the provisions of the Constitution.' However, Article 311 is not subject to Articles 309 and 310 or any other provisions of the Constitution. It is in this manner that the common law principle of 'doctrine of pleasure' has been adopted in its modified form in our Constitution Except to the extent of the guarantee contained in Article 311 of the Constitution and the provisions of the rules made under Article 309, the common law right of the Government to terminate the service of its servant continues. The result is that whenever a Government servant claims that the termination of his service is void and he is entitled to continue in service, he must show the breach of any of these provisions in order to substantiate his claim that the termination of his service is void and in effective. [Para 6
(3) Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966 (MP) -R.10 -fundamental right of equality in respect of punishment - when available-import of the words 'for good and sufficient reasons' - provide sufficient guidelines - discretion has not to be exercised arbitrarily - rule is not ultra vires-Constitution of India-Arts 14 and 16.
It is true that the fundamental right of equality contained in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution is available to government servants and in a case where there is such hostile discrimination between persons similarly placed the impugned action may be liable to be struck down for violation of this fundamental right but that would not by itself render Rule 10 invalid because there is no vice of hostile discrimination in Rule 10 itself. Moreover, Rule 10 furnishes a reasonable and workable guide line in the words 'for good and sufficient reasons' used therein. The discretion of the disciplinary authority is, therefore, controlled by the guideline furnished by this expression used in Rule 10.
The question as to what is 'good and sufficient reason' for imposing a particular penalty in a given case would be one of fact and no hard and fast rule can be laid down for that purpose. If the penalty imposed in a particular case is challenged on the ground that it is arbitrary and not 'for good and sufficient reason' the question will have to be examined in that light because it is settled that wherever discretion is given it has to be exercised on sound principles and not arbitrarily or according to the whim and caprice of the authority. Arbitrariness is the very negation of the rule of law, the system which governs us. AIR 1964 SC 600 and AIR 1961 SC 1715 referred to. [Para 7
( 1. ) THE petitioner was appointed Chairman in the Revenue inspectors office in 1953 and was confirmed in that capacity in 1956. The petitioner was suspended on 6-11-1974 pending a departmental enquiry into the charges contained in the charge-sheet Annexure-A. The substance of the charges levelled against him was of habitual unauthorized absence from duty for a long period and of intimidating the superior officer-the Revenue inspector-to withdraw the report made by him against the petitioner of his unauthorized absence under threat of assault. The petitioner denied these charges and consequently a departmental enquiry was held for enquiring into their correctness. The Enquiry Officer found these charges proved against the petitioner in his report Annexure-C dated 19-4-1975. A show cause notice was acordingly given to the petitioner and after considering his reply to it, the Collector, Tikamgarh, by his order Annexure-E dated 16-12-1975 accepting the report of the Enquiry Officer, terminated the petitioners service. Petitioners appeal to the Commissioner, Sagar Division, was dismissed by order Annexure-F dated 23-8-1976, and the State Government has thereafter by its order Annexure-G dated 10-3-1977 rejected the petitioners revision. Aggrieved by the termination of his service in this manner, the petitioner has filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging these orders.
( 2. ) SHRI D. M. Dharmadbikari, learned counsel for the petitioner, has advanced several arguments in support of this petition, which are the following, viz.-
(1) The reports Exhibits P-1 and P-2 made by the Revenue Inspector and the report Exhibit P-3 made by the Tahsildar on the basis of which the aforesaid charges were levelled against the petitioner were not shown to the petitioner at any time during the departmental enquiry even though they were taken into account by the Enquiry Officer and this has resulted in denial of reasonable opportunity to the petitioner to defend himself;
(2) The petitioner was not given any opportunity to lead evidence in his defence which also has resulted in denial of reasonable opportunity to defend himself;
(3) The penalty of termination of service is too harsh and disproportionate in view of the charges found proved against the petitioner; and
(4) Rule 10 of the M. P. Civil Services (Classification, Control and appeal) Rules, 1966 is invalid because it gives an arbitrary discretion to the disciplinary authority to impose the penalties mentioned therein on a government servant without laying down any guidelines to indicate when a minor penalty mentioned therein has to be imposed and when a major penalty is to be imposed on a Government servant. It is contended that the necessary guidelines are not contained either in Rule 10 or in any other rule contained in the M. P. Civil Services (Classification, control and Appeal) Rules, 1966.
( 3. ) THE first contention of learned counsel for the petitioner cannot be accepted. The three reports P-1, P-2 and P-3 in the record of the depart-mental enquiry were produced by the Revenue Inspector and the Tahsildar who had made those reports, when they were examined as witnesses in the departmenal enquiry in the petitioners presence. The petitioner made no such grievance during the departmental enquiry or even in his reply to the show cause notice given at a time when the contents of the Enquiry Officers report were known to him. It is obvious that no such complaint was made then by the petitioner for the reason that he was aware of the contents of those reports on the basis of which the charges were levelled against him leading to the departmental enquiry. No prejudice of any kind to the petitioner has been shown to us. Learned counsel contended that without knowing the contents of these reports the petitioner was unable to properly cross-examine the Revenue Inspector and the Tahsildar. If that was really the petitioners grievance there is no reason why the pe
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