( 1. ) THE order in this petition shall also govern the disposal of Miscellaneous Petitions Nos. 500 and 509 both of 1982.

( 2. ) A common question in all these three petitions for decision is whether the petitioner establishment engaged in furtherance of popularly known Family Planning Scheme is an "industry within the meaning of Section 2 (j) of the Industrial Disputes Act ? ( 3. ) THE petitioner in all the three petitions is a society constituted under the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Societies Registration Act, 1960 (Act No. 21 of 1960 ). Its object is to advance social, economic, educational and cultural standard of women and its field of operations is Tikamgarh district. It also endeavoured to assist the State Government in advancement of the Family Planning Programme. For this purpose the respondents Smt. Beni Bai (in M. P. No. 498 of 1982) was engaged as Health Assistant, Smt. Sharikunnisa (inm. P. No. 498 of 1982) as Village Worker and Smt. Margarate Masih (in M. P. No. 509 of 1982) as an Aya. The society terminated their services. All the aforesaid three employees approached the Labour Court by a petition under Section 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 laying a claim for certain amount as difference of salary. Their assertion had been that they were paid less by the employer, namely, the petitioner, during the period they served it and were in its employment. Those applications were proceeded exparte and have been allowed by the impugned orders directing the petitioner to pay certain amounts to the respondents-employees.

( 4. ) AT the hearing, Shri Y. S. Dharmadhikari, counsel for the petitioner, raised an objection as to the maintainability of those applications and also questioned the jurisdiction of the Industrial Court to entertain and decide them on the ground that the petitioners establishment was not an "industry" and that those employees were not "workmen". Learned counsel submitted that under the circumstances of the case, the petitioner cannot be held to be an "industry". The terms "industry" and "workman" are defined in Section 2 (j) and (s) respectively of the Industrial Disputes Act as follows:

"2 (j ). "industry" means any business, trade, undertaking, manufacture of calling of employees and includes any calling, service, employment, handicraft, or industrial occupation or avocation of workmen; (s) "workman" means any person (including an apprentice) employed in any industry to do any manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical or supervisory work for hire or reward, whether the terms of employment be express or implied, and for the purpose of any proceeding under this Act in relation to an industrial dispute, includes any such person who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched in connection with, or as a consequence of, that dispute, or whose dismissal, discharge or retre-nchment had led to that dispute, but does not include any such person - (i) who is subject to the Air Force Act, 1950 (45 of 1950), or the Army Act, 1950 (46 of 1950), or the Navy Act, 1957 (62 or 1957); or (ii) who is employed in the police service or as an officer of other employee of a prison; or (iii) who is employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity; or (iv) who, being employed in a supervisory capacity, draws wages exceeding one thousand six hundred rupees per mensem or exercises, either by the nature of the duties attached to the office or by reason of the powers vested in him, functions mainly of a managerial nature. Evidently, this term "industry" in its application to various establishments became the subject matter of considerable debate at the Bar. The question as to what is "industry" has continuously baffled and perplexed the Courts. It has defined analysis, so that judicial effort has been ultimately reduced merely to evolving tests by reference to characteristics, regarded as essential for constituting an activity as an "industry". Divergent views were expres