( 1. ) THIS revision petition is directed against the order dated 29-1-1988 passed by the IIIrd Additional Sessions Judge, Shajapur, Camp shujalpur in Sessions Trial No. 1 of 1988 framing charge under Section 307/149 of the Indian Penal Code against the petitioners.

( 2. ) CIRCUMSTANCES giving rise to the revision petition are these. According to the first information report the informants brother Kailash is a licensed vendor of magazines at the Shujalpur railway station. The petitioners Kailash and kuldeep are the servants of the petitioner Motiram and indulged in unauthorised sales of newspapers and magazines. The informant Balmakund had asked them to desist from indulging in such sales. In consequence, on 17-6-1987 at about 8 a. m. the petitioners, five in number, duly armed, attacked him. Motiram had declared that he should be done, to death. The informant sustained several injuries including one incised one on the head and had fallen unconscious.

( 3. ) AT the conclusion of investigation, the police filed challan against the petitioners and the charge aforesaid has been framed against them.

( 4. ) THE contention of the petitioners learned counsel is that looking to the injuries no case for charge under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code can be said to have been made out.

( 5. ) THE contention of the learned counsel for the non-applicant State is that as held in the decision in Radheshyams case, Criminal Revision No. 199/84, decided on 30-5-1988 the order framing charge is not revisable.

( 6. ) IT is next contended that charge may be framed if the material is sufficient for a strong suspicion of the guilt and in the instant case the material on record is sufficient to sustain the charge of attempted murder.

( 7. ) THE point for consideration is whether the revision petition deserves to be allowed.

( 8. ) SECTION 397 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (for short the code) lays down that powers of revision shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order. The Code does not define interlocutory order. The legislature retaining the power of revision has so provided in respect of the interlocutory order and the purpose behind this is to keep such an order outside the purview of the powers of revision so that the inquiry or trial may proceed without delay. In this connection the decision in Smt. Parmeshwaridevis case, air 1977 SC 403 is pertinent.

( 9. ) IT may be pointed out that the word interlocutory has not been used in the aforesaid provision as converse of the final order and in between the two there may be intermediate orders. In paragraph 24 of the decision in Usmanbhais case, AIR 1988 SC 922 which relates to Terrorists and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (28 of 1987) it has been pointed out that on reviewing the entire case law on the subject, the following two principles were deduced therefrom, namely, (1) that a final order has to be interpreted in contradistinction an interlocutory order; and (2) that the basis for determining finality of an order is whether the judgment or order finally disposes of the rights of the parties.

( 10. ) ACCORDING to the decision in Amarnaths case, AIR 1977 SC 2185 the term interlocutory order has been used in the provision in a restricted sense and not in any broad or artistic sense and covers only orders of a purely interim or temporary nature which do not decide or touch the important rights or the liabilities of the parties. The decision points out that any order which substantially affects the rights of the accused or decides certain rights of the parties cannot be said to be an interlocutory order so as to bar a revision in the high Court against that order, because that would be against the very object which forms the basis for insertion of the provision regarding revision. Thus, for instance, orders summoning witnesses, adjourning cases, passing orders for bail, calling for reports and such other steps in aid of the pending proceedings, may no d