( 1. ) THIS appeal is directed against the order dated 17-10-1986 passed by the Additional Judge to the District Judge, Dewas in C. S. No. 8-A of 1985 whereby the application of the respondent No. 1 under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 Civil Procedure Code has been allowed.

( 2. ) IT is not in dispute that the property in question comprising of survey No. 67 area 2. 17 acres situate at village Napakhedi Tahsil Dewas is entered in revenue papers in the names of Rahmatbai and Kallu the appellants.

( 3. ) ACCORDING to the respondent No. 1 Shivjiram the property aforesaid was purchased by Mubarik, the brother of Kallu and husband of Rahmatbai from one ghasiram. The said Mubarik with the consent of Rahmatbai and Kallu entered into an agreement dated 3-8-1982 to sell the property to him for a consideration of Rs. 28,000/-and obtained Rs. 5,000/- as part payment of the price and delivered possession of the property to him. On the following day the respondent Shivji withdrew Rs. 18,000/- from the bank and paid it to the respondent No. 2 Mubarik who signed the relevant entry. Mubarik received the remaining Rs. 5,000/- on different dates. The appellants and mubarik evaded execution of the deed and ultimately refused to do so. They want to enter into forcible possession of the land and hence the suit instituted on 8-8-1985.

( 4. ) THE application was resisted by the appellants. According to them, the land in dispute is all alone in their possession and Mubarik had no right to execute the alleged agreement.

( 5. ) THE learned lower Court observing that Mubarik had not replied to the notice by Shivji found that the payment of full price had been made. It further found that in the inquiry to which the appellants were parties, the Revenue Court has found that during the years 1982-83 and 83-84 Shivji was in possession of the land in dispute and there is nothing to indicate that Shivji has, at any time later, been dispossessed.

( 6. ) THE point for consideration is whether the impugned order deserves to be set aside. It is well-settled that a person who seeks temporary injunction must show that the three well-known concurrent conditions necessary for its grant exist in his favour. He must satisfy the Court -firstly, that there is a serious question to be tried in the suit and that on the facts before the court there is a probability of his being entitled to the relief asked for by him, secondly, that the Courts interference is necessary to protect him from that species of injury which the court calls irreparable, before his legal right can be established on trial, and thirdly, that the comparative mischief or inconvenience which is likely to issue from withholding the injunction will be greater than that which is likely to arise from granting it.

( 7. ) THE first of the above conditions is what is generally termed "a prima facie case". In other words, the prima facie existence of a right and its infringement are the first condition for the grant of temporary injunction. But the existence of a prima facie is not by itself sufficient. The applicant has to further satisfy the second condition by showing that irreparable injury will accrue to him if the injunction is not granted and that there is no other remedy open to him by which he can protect himself from the consequences of the apprehended injury. The term "irreparable injury" however, does not mean that there must be no physical possibility of repairing the injury, but means only that the injury must be a material one, i. e. , one that cannot be adequately compensated for in damages. The third condition is what is called the principle of the "balance of convenience". In applying this principle, the Court should weigh the amount of substantial mischief that is likely to be done to the applicant if the injunction is refused and compare it with that which is likely to be caused to the other side if the injunction is granted if, on such a consideration, the court thinks that pending the determinat