( 1. ) THE short question that arises in this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is, whether section 271 (1) of the Madhya Pradesh Panchayats Act, 1962 is ultra vires the State legislature on the ground that it offends against Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution.

( 2. ) THE grievance of the petitioners is that section 271 (I) of the Madhya pradesh Panchayats Act, 1962 is constitutionally void inasmuch as it affects (i) the fundamental right of the petitioner No. 1 Chandra Shekhar Sharma an advocate practising at Barwaha, to carry on his profession guaranteed by Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution; and (ii) the right of the petitioner No. 2 amarsingh who is being tried before the Nyaya Panchayat Barwaha, to be represented by a legal practitioner of his choice.

( 3. ) THE problem before us had to be viewed from two angles; first from the view point of the legal practitioners ; and secondly from that of the litigants. Though the question for consideration, as to whether section 271 (I)of the Panchayats Act offends Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution, is of considerable importance to the litigant public it is general and the legal profession in particular, it is no longer res Integra, it being practically concluded by several decisions of the various High Court, from both the view points noted above.

( 4. ) SECTION 271 (1) of the Madhya Pradesh Panchayats Act 1962, reads: "271 (1 ). No legal practitioner shall appear, plead or act, on behalf of any party, in any suit or case or proceeding before a Nyaya Panchayat; provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply to any party who having been arrested in any criminal case, has been brought for trial before a Nyaya Panchayat. "

The contention that an advocate enrolled under the Advocates Act, 1961, has the absolute right to practise before all Courts and tribunals can hardly be accepted. Such a right is no doubt conferred by section 30 of the Advocates act. But unfortunately for the legal profession, section 30 has not been brought into force so far, though the Act has been on the statute book for the last twelve years. There is very little that we can do in the matter and it is for the Bar to take it up elsewhere. A person enrolled as an advocate under the Advocates Act is not Ipso Facto entitled to a right of audience in all Courts, unless section 30 of that Act is first brought into force. That is a matter which is still regulated by different statutes and the extent of the right to practise must depend on the terms of those statutes. The right of the first petitioner to practise is, therefore, just what is conferred on him by section 14 (1) (a) (b) and (c) of the Bar Councils Act, 1926. The relevant provision reads as follows: "14 (1) an advocate shall be entitled as of right to practise - (a) subject to the provisions of sub-section (4) of section 9, in the High Court of which he is an advocate, and (b) save as otherwise provided by sub-section (2) or by or under any other law for the time being in force in any other Court and before any other Tribunal or person legally authorised to take evidence, and (c) before any other authority or person before whom such advocate is by or under the law for the time being in force entitled to practise. "

Under section 14 (1) (b) an advocate is no doubt entitled as of right to practise. But the right is not an absolute right. It is a right "subject to the provisions of any law for the time being in force. " This right is also a privilege as it is limited to those who are admitted to the Bar. The right to practise has throughout been held to be "not an absolute right, but a privilege or a franchise". In view of the various authorities on the subject, we cannot but hold that section 271 (1) of the Madhya Pradesh Panchayats Act is not an unconstitutional restriction on advocates to practise their profession.

( 5. ) IN Mulchand Gulabchand v. Mukund Shivram Bhide (AIR 1952 Bom. 296.), the question arose before Chagla