( 1. ) THIS revision under seetion 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, filed by the defendant, is directed against an order of the Second Additional district Judge, Raipur, dated 26th September 1968, holding that the subject-matter in dispute is not covered by section 82 (1) (c) of the Madhya Pradesh co-operative Societies Act (No. XVII of 1961) (hereinafter referred to as the act), inasmuch as it was not a dispute required to be referred to the Registrar under section 64 (1) (c) of the Act.

( 2. ) THE material facts are these. The State Bank of India Employees housing Co-operative Society Limited, Raipur is a housing Society within the meaning of section 2 (n) of the Act, as its object is to provide its members with residential accommodation, and is also a society as defined in section 2 (z), as it is registered as a co-operative society under the Act. By virtue of a sale deed dated 5-1-1966, the society purchased a piece of land in Dumar Talab, raipur, from the plaintiff: Naval Shankar and Kanti Lal,who have now filed this suit for ejectment of the Society from the portions delineated by letters dhid and FEHGF in the plaint map, alleging that it has encroached upon these areas which are outside the property conveyed under the deed. The society thereupon raised an objection to the maintainability of the suit, and, accordingly, a preliminary issue was framed on the question of jurisdiction.

( 3. ) THE revision must be dismissed on the short ground that the learned judge has rightly held that the jurisdiction of Civil Court to entertain a suit of this kind is not barred under the terms of section 82 (1) (c) of the Art. That section reads:

"save as provided in this Act, no civil or revenue Court shall have any jurisdiction in respect of any dispute required to be referred to the Registrar. " While interpreting this section, the general rule as regards construction of statutes excluding the jurisdiction of Civil Courts must be kept in view. The ordinary rule of construction is that statutes affecting the jurisdiction of Civil courts, i. e. , ousting their jurisdiction, must be very strictly construed. Every presumption should be made in favour of the jurisdiction and its exclusion is not to be readily inferred, but must be either explicitly expressed or clearly implied. [see, Secretary of State v. Mask and Co. (AIR 1940 P. C. 105.)]. Now, the bar of jurisdiction under section 82 (1) (c) is in respect of any dispute required to be referred to the Registrar. The disputes which are so required to be referred are enumerated in section 64 ibid. The relevant portion of that section reads :

"notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, any dispute touching the business of a society shall be referred to the Registrar by any of the parties to the dispute, if the parties thereto are among the following: * * * (c) a person other than a member of the society with whom the society has or had business transactions and any person claiming through such a person. "

(Italics mine)

( 4. ) THE short questions for consideration in this case are-

(1) Whether the suit is in respect of any dispute touching the business of the defendant society within the meaning of section 64 (I) : and

(2) If so, whether, by reason of the purchase of the land in its favour, the society had any business transaction with its vendors, the plaintiffs herein. It is common ground that the main object with which the defendant society has been incorporated is to provide housing accommodation to its members, and it is, therefore, urged that acquisition of any land, bv purchase or otherwise, by the defendant society is in the course of its ordinary business and necessarily any dispute touching its assets would fall within the ambit of

section 64 ibid. The contention cannot re accepted, for the reasons that I shall presently state

( 5. ) AS to the first, the phrase touching the business of a society had been interpreted by a Full Bench of thi