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1990 Supreme(MP) 403

R.C. Lahoti, J.
Sushila Bai W/O Ram Nihore Patel
vs
Ram Nihore Jagatdhari Prasad ...
Decided on : 15 October, 1990

A party cannot, by marrying immediately after a decree of divorce, deprive the other party of the chance to pursue an appeal.

Headnote:

HINDU MARRIAGE ACT, 1955 - SECTION 15 - LIMITATION ACT, 1963 - SECTION 5 - ORDER 9, RULE 13, CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE - EX PARTE DECREE - SETTING ASIDE - REMARRIAGE BY RESPONDENT DURING PENDENCY OF APPEAL - EFFECT - APPEAL NOT RENDERED INFRUCTUOUS.

Fact of the Case:

The appellant wife filed an application under Order 9, Rule 13, Civil Procedure Code, seeking to set aside an ex parte decree of divorce granted in favor of the respondent husband. The appellant alleged that she was not properly served with the summons and that the respondent had misled her into believing that the proceedings would be terminated. The respondent contested the application, denying the appellant's allegations.

Finding of the Court:

The trial court dismissed the appellant's application, finding that the appellant had failed to substantiate her allegations. The appellant filed an appeal, and the respondent argued that the appeal had become infructuous because he had remarried during the pendency of the appeal.

Issues: 1. Whether the appellant was properly served with the summons in the divorce proceedings. 2. Whether the respondent misled the appellant into believing that the divorce proceedings would be terminated. 3. Whether the appeal had become infructuous due to the respondent's remarriage during the pendency of the appeal.

Ratio Decidendi: 1. The court found that the appellant had made out a case for setting aside the ex parte decree. The court relied on the appellant's testimony and the testimony of her witness, as well as on the fact that the presiding judge was on leave on the date that the appellant was allegedly served with the summons. 2. The court held that the respondent's remarriage during the pendency of the appeal did not render the appeal infructuous. The court relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Smt. Lata Kamat v. Vilas, AIR 1989 SC 1477, which held that a party cannot, by marrying immediately after a decree of divorce, deprive the other party of the chance to pursue an appeal. 3. The court also held that the appellant was not required to file a separate application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, as the facts entitling her to the benefit of Section 5 were pleaded in the application under Order 9, Rule 13, Civil Procedure Code.

Final Decision: The court allowed the appeal, set aside the impugned order rejecting the appellant's application under Order 9, Rule 13, Civil Procedure Code, and set aside the ex parte decree and the ex parte proceedings. The court directed the District Judge to hear and dispose of the divorce suit by relegating the parties back to the commencement of proceedings held on 20-12-1987, affording the appellant an opportunity of participating thereat.

ORDER

R.C. Lahoti, J.

1. The wife appellant has come up in appeal aggrieved by an order dated 4-11-1988 passed by the District Judge, Morena, rejecting her application Under Order 9, Rule 13, Civil Procedure Code seeking setting aside of an ex parte decree of divorce dated 19-1-1988 passed in C.O.S. No. 17- A/87 by the District Judge, Morena in favour of the husband/respondent.

2. The application Under Order 9, Rule 13, Civil Procedure Code was filed on 28-3-1988 alleging that process server had come to her on 3-10-1987 but she told him to come on the following day because she wanted to consult her husband before accepting the summons. At that time the couple was living together. In the evening when the husband returned from the office, he told the wife that the proceedings were initiated by him in a fit of anger and the appellant need not bother nor attend the Court because he would have the proceedings terminated which would otherwise gathered the knowledge of the ex parte decree on 17-3-1988 when the husband/respondent told her that the marriage between them had been dissolved by a decree of divorce.

3. The husband/respondent contested the prayer by denying all the averments made in the application.

4. The wife/appellant examined herself and a witness Banshidhar in support of the application. The husband, one Shyamnarayan and Kailash Yadav, the process server, appeared in the witness-box in rebuttal of the appellant's evidence. The trial Court found tha the averments made in the application were not substantiated and hence the application was liable to be dismissed.

5. The, application Under Order 9, Rule 13, Civil Procedure Code having been rejected on 4-11-1988, certified copy of the order was applied for on 16-11-1988 and delivered on 24-11-1988. On 15-12-1988 this appeal was filed within the prescribed period of limitation. The memo of appeal is accompanied by an application for staying the decree of divorce. This Court was not inclined to grant an ex parte order and imply directed a notice to be issued to the respondent. On 17-4-1989 the respondent came out with a reply that he was served in the appeal on 2-3-1989 but he had remarried on 18-1-1989 and hence the appeal had become infructuous.

6. At the hearing the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the appellant, corroborated by her witness Banshidhar, had made out a case for setting aside the ex parte decree and the Court consistently with the well settled principles applicable to such cases should have taken a liberal view of the things specially when the marital status of a lady was in jeopardy and should have set aside the ex parte decree. She has more vigorously banked upon an additional fact and raised a contention, which has been unanswerable, by proceeding certified copies of order sheets dated 5-10-1987 and 20-10-1987 from the record of C.O.S. No. 17-A/87. Learned counsel submits that the record reveals that on 5-110-1987 the presiding Judge of the Court was on leave; the Court reader adjourned the case to 20-10-1987 for orders; so the date 5-10-1987 could not be deemed to be a date of hearing while she had no notice of the date 20-10-1987 on which day the Court proceeded ex parte. Thus the direction to proceed ex parte and the consequent ex-parte proceedings are both illegal and liable to be set aside. This contention being purely legal and going to the root of the matter has been allowed to be raised and the learned counsel for parties heard.

7. The contention finds implicit support from a decision of this Court in Mohanlal Brijlal v. Manga, 1986 CCLJ Short Note 39. This Court held, in identical facts, that the next date having been appointed for further orders by the Court reader, in the absence of the presiding officer, could not be deemed to be a date fixed for hearing and the party's absence on that date did not give jurisdiction to proceed ex parte.

8. Faced with the situation the learned counsel for the respondent chose to fall back on plea of limi










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