S.K. Dubey, J.

1. Short contention of Mr. Sharma, learned counsel for the appellant, is that on the date of accident, the insured Bijendrasingh, who is insured in the records of insurance company and the policy was issued in his name, covering risk of the vehicle No. CPH 5167, transferred the vehicle to one Ajit Kumar. As this was a suppression of the material fact, the policy lapsed from the date of transfer. The name of Ajit Kumar is also recorded in the records of Regional Transport Authority. Therefore, the Tribunal, without holding an enquiry, committed an illegality in passing order under Section 92-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (for short 'the Act').

2. Mr. R.D. Jain, learned counsel for respondent No. 4, contended that this is not the appropriate stage where the defence under Section 96 (2) of the Act can be considered while deciding an application under Section 92-A of the Act. All the defences under Section 96 (2) of the Act will have to be tried and then decided after recording the evidence.

3. Learned counsel for the claimant contended that as the vehicle was insured with the insurance company which fact has also been admitted in the written statement in para 8, therefore, prima facie, the insurance company, the driver and owner are liable to pay the amount of Rs. 15,000/- which has been awarded as an interim award on no fault liability basis. Learned counsel, Mr. Goyal, placed reliance on two decisions of Gauhati and Delhi High Courts reported in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Member, Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal 1988 ACJ 612 (Gauhati) and New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. N.P. Tyagi 1989 ACJ 599 (Delhi). Learned counsel also placed reliance on the decision of this court in Oriental Fire and General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Bandhan 1988 (II) MPWN 104, wherein this court had taken the view that the purpose of Section 92-A is to award interim maintenance without delay and the relationship between the insurer and insured cannot be decided before grant of interim award.

4. Mr. V.K. Sharma, counsel for the appellant, in reply to the submissions made by learned counsel for the respondent contended that when the insurance company cannot be made liable to pay the amount of final award, no order under Section 92-A can also be passed against the insurance company and for that reliance was placed on Apex Court's decision in Kashiram Yadav v. Oriental Fire & General Insurance Co. Ltd. 1989 ACJ 1078 (SC).

5. After hearing counsel, I am clearly of the opinion that the defences available under Section 96 (2) of the Act cannot be taken into consideration at the time of consideration of application under Section 92-A of the Act. Following the idea behind Section 92-A of the Act being payment of prompt and immediate compensation, the purpose cannot be allowed to be frustrated by deciding various defences raised by the insurance company which would take time. In case it is ultimately found that the insurer is not liable to indemnify the insured an appropriate order under Section 96 (4) of the Act can be passed.

6. In case of New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Phoolwati 1986 ACJ 106 (MP), this court while considering the defence raised by the insurance company held that the vehicle at the relevant time of accident was stationary and the other vehicle was the offending vehicle and that the owner was not made a party. This court, while considering the object under Section 92-A of the Act which created 'no fault' liability and question of liability was to be adjudged, held that section created 'no fault' liability and the question of liability being attached to a vehicle, which ought to have been offending vehicle, becomes otiose and objection about non-joinder of owner or insurer of the offending vehicle falls to the ground. Provision in Section 92-A of the Act is meant to help all destitutes, who are affected by the motor accident and not only to those who are pedestrians or their legal representatives.

7. It is not the case of the a