Adverse possession requires express or implied denial of the true owner's title. Mere possession, however old, does not become adverse.

K.M. Agarwal, J.

1. This second appeal by the plaintiff is directed against the reversing judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court. It was admitted for hearing on 29-9-1977 on the questions raised in paragraph 7 of the memo of appeal. The following questions of law were proposed in paragraph 7 of the memo of second appeal : -

"(i) Whether in absence of plea and proof of the essential ingredients (Nec vi, Nec clam, Nec Precario) of adverse possession the suit can be held to be time barred?

"(ii) Whether the character of the possession prior to 8-11-1960 or 11-9-1962 being on the Defendant's own showing as that of agent or of a person claiming subordinate title, can be considered to be adverse in character and the suit can be held to be time barred?

"(iii) Whether the construction put on Exs.P.7 and P.22 is erroneous and has resulted in failure of justice?"

On 3-9-1991, LA. No. 6638/91 was filed on behalf of the appellant for permission to urge the following additional question of law at the time of hearing of appeal:

"Whether on facts and circumstances, the right of a Bhumiswami accrues upon the defendants by operation of Section 190 of M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959 ?"

The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the proposed additional question of law arose out of paragraph 18 of the impugned judgment of the lower appellate Court. The learned counsel for the legal representatives of the deceased respondent did not object hearing on the proposed additional question of law. Accordingly the learned counsel for the parties were heard on the questions framed by this Court as also on the proposed additional question of law.

2. It is not in dispute that initially Khasra Nos. 2844/1, 2844/2 and 2845, area 1.49 acres of land, (in short, the "suit land"), situated at Sarsed Pargana, Chhatarpur were held in Bhumiswami right by the appellant and that they were recorded in its favour. The deceased respondent Prem Singh was for some time in the employment of the appellant. According to the appellant, it was limited company with its head office at Jullundhar and branch office at Bijawar. The deceased respondent Prem Singh was in its employment as a forwarding agent posted at Harpalpur and accordingly as agent of the appellant, he was in possession of the suit land. In 1948, the employment of the deceased respondent with the appellant came to an end, but he continued to be in possession of the suit land. Somehow he obtained a 'Patta' from the Court of Naib Tahsildar in respect of the suit land on the basis of his application (Ex.P.7) filed for the purpose on 8-11-1960. Appellant subsequently filed an application under Section 176(2) of the M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959 (in short, the "Code"), for cancellation of the said -'Patta' in favour of the deceased respondent and for restoration of Bhumiswami right over the suit land. The application was rejected by the Naib Tahsildar. Appeals and revision preferred against this order were dismissed, but in Miscellaneous Petition No. 9 of 1968, decided on 12-2-1971 (Ex.P.4), all the orders and proceedings of the revenue Courts pursuant to the deceased respondent's application dated 8-11-1960 were quashed by holding them to be without jurisdiction. The appellant-thereafter filed the present suit on 4-9-1972 for declaration of its title as Bhumiswami over the suit land, for possession thereof and for mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 100/- per year from 8-11-1960. The suit was resisted mainly on two grounds : That the defendant had perfected his title by adverse possession and further that the company had ceased to exist and, therefore, the suit was not maintainable. The trial Court was pleased to decree the suit, restricting past mesne profits to a period of three years prior to the date of suit. Being aggrieved, the deceased defendant filed an appeal, which was allowed by the impugned judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court and the suit of the appellant was dismissed on the ground