The inherent power of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is not controlled by sub-section (3) of Sections 397 and 399 of the Code.

S.D. Jha, J.

1. The Question arising for consideration in this Misc. Cri. Case and other similar Misc. Cri. Cases Nos. 888/92, Mis. Rajdhani Distillers v. M. P. State and 2428/92, Gajendra Kumar Sharma v. M. P. State, at this stage is whether prohibition under Sections 397(3) and 399(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter called 'Code') as to entertaining second revision application by this Court at the instance of the person, who had made application to Sessions Judge, prevents this Court from exercising its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code even when requisite conditions for exercise of such power as stipulated in three Judge Bench in Madhu Limaye v. State of Bihar, 1978 Cr. LJ. 165 (SC) are fulfilled.

2. The question arises in view of recent decision of the Supreme Cout in Rajkumar Manchanda v. State of Karnataka, 1990 (Suppl) SCC 192, inter alia holding that merely by saying that jurisdiction of the High Court for exercise of its inherent power was being invoked, the statutory bar (under Section 397, Criminal Procedure Code) could not have been overcome.

3. At the hearing Shri S. G. Bagadiya argued that the two Judge Bench decision of Supreme Court in Rajkumar Manchanda's case (supra) had not taken note of an earlier three Judge Bench decision of the Supreme Court in Madhu Limaye v. State of Bihar, 1978 Cr. LJ. 165 (SC). He submitted that this exercise of inherent power under Section 482 of the Code is not controlled any sub-section (3) of Section 397 of the Code. In support of his contention he relied on decision- of Rajasthan High Court in Raju and Ors. v. State of Rajasthan, 1991 Cr. LJ. 123, dealing with the scope and content of inherent power of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code. The decision dealing with the scope and content of inherent power under Section 482 of the Code in spite of Rajkumar Manchanda's case (supra) held that in appropriate case on requisite conditions being fulfilled, inherent power under Section 482 of the Code can be exercised by the High Court and that Section 397(3) would not be a bar to exercise of the same.

4. Other learned counsel appearing in other cases for the petitioners have more or less as to maintainability of the petition urged similar arguments.

5. In the present case Shri P. K. Saxena, learned counsel representing the respondent, however, submitted that having regard to Supreme Court decision in Rajkumar Manchanda's case (supra) the petitions for exercise of inherent power under Section 482 of the Code would not at all be maintainable and would deserve straightway rejection without looking into merits of the same. He submitted that without examining the merits of the case the present petition should straightway be dismissed.

6. For case of reference and proper appreciation of Section 482 of the Code and other relevant provisions for the. purpose of this order are reproduced below:-

Section 482 : Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Section 397 :

(1) The High Court or any Sessions Judge may call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any inferior Criminal Court situate within its or his local jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior court, and may, when calling for such record, direct that the execution of any sentence or order be suspended, and if the accused is in confinement, that he be released on bail or orr his bond pending the examination of the record.

(2) The powers of revision conferred by sub-section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other