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1994 Supreme(MP) 1005

I.P. Rao, J.
Prem Kaur Ahuja
vs
Sardar Karam Singh
Decided On : 15 December, 1994

The court interpreted and applied Sections 12(1)(a), (c), and (m) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961, to hold that the material alteration made by the tenant, the landlord's bona fide requirement, and the acts of nuisance committed by the tenant were sufficient grounds for eviction.

Headnote:

M.P. ACCOMMODATION CONTROL ACT, 1961 - SECTION 12(1)(A), (C), (M) - NUISANCE, BONA FIDE REQUIREMENT, MATERIAL ALTERATION - INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION.

Fact of the Case:

A tenant appealed against a decree for eviction passed against him on the grounds of nuisance, bona fide requirement, and material alteration. The tenant argued that the material alteration was not substantial enough to warrant eviction, that the landlord's bona fide requirement no longer existed, and that the acts of nuisance were not proven.

Finding of the Court:

The court held that the material alteration made by the tenant, which was the construction of a wall on the verandah without permission, was sufficient to warrant eviction under Section 12(1)(m) of the Act. The court also held that the landlord's bona fide requirement was genuine and that the acts of nuisance committed by the tenant, such as disconnecting the electricity supply and interfering with the pump house, constituted sufficient grounds for eviction under Section 12(1)(c) of the Act.

Issues: 1. Whether the material alteration made by the tenant was substantial enough to warrant eviction under Section 12(1)(m) of the Act? 2. Whether the landlord's bona fide requirement was genuine? 3. Whether the acts of nuisance committed by the tenant constituted sufficient grounds for eviction under Section 12(1)(c) of the Act?

Ratio Decidendi: 1. The court held that the material alteration made by the tenant, which was the construction of a wall on the verandah without permission, was sufficient to warrant eviction under Section 12(1)(m) of the Act because it was to the detriment of the landlord's interest and was likely to diminish its value substantially. 2. The court held that the landlord's bona fide requirement was genuine because he needed the premises for his son and grandchildren, who were dependent on him. 3. The court held that the acts of nuisance committed by the tenant, such as disconnecting the electricity supply and interfering with the pump house, constituted sufficient grounds for eviction under Section 12(1)(c) of the Act because they caused annoyance and inconvenience to the landlord.

Final Decision: The court dismissed the appeal and upheld the decree for eviction passed by the courts below.

JUDGMENT

I.P. Rao, J.

1. This is a second appeal filed by the tenant against whom a decree for eviction in respect of the ground floor of the house occupied by him as a tenant has been passed.

2. The respondent landlord filed a suit for eviction originally on the grounds of nuisance, arrears of rent and material alteration. By amendment dated 31-7-1979 the landlord added the ground of bond fide requirement on the allegation that his son who is working in Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board has been transferred to Jabalpur. Both the courts have ordered eviction on the grounds of nuisance, bona fide need and material alteration by making unauthorised construction of a wall and converting verandah into a room. The second appeal was admitted by this court on 28-9-1993 on the following substantial questions of law :

(1) whether, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the decree granted by the Courts below for ejectment under Section 12(1 )(a), (c) and (m) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 is in accordance with law?

(2) whether the children of the son of the landlord can be included in the definition of member of the family as given in Section 2(a) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961?

3. The first question comprises of the three grounds upon which the eviction was ordered by the Courts below. The learned counsel for the appellant argued that under Section 12(l)(m) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act (hereinafter referred as the Act') the material alteration will afford a ground for eviction only when it is to the detriment of the landlord's interest or is likely to diminish its value substantially. The learned Counsel for the Appellant argued that the landlord urged the ground of material alteration on the supposition that the Corporation can penalise him for the unauthorised constructions and the construction affects light and air to the inner portion of the house; that while arriving at the finding the Courts below have not taken into consideration the mandatory requirement under Section 12, clause (10) of the Act; that though the trial Court passed the decree under Section 12(l)(c) of the Act on the ground of nuisance, the lower appellate Court has reversed that finding, that there is no discussion on Issue No. 4 with regard to the nuisance; that therefore, it should be deemed that the ground of nuisance is not made out and the bona fide need of the landlord no longer exists in view of the facts that even after the transfer of the landlord's son to Jabalpur he did not occupy the first floor of the house; that the grand children of the landlord were taking education wherever his son was working; that the plaintiff alone is residing now in the first floor of the house and as such the ground of bona fide requirement is not substantiated.

4. The first objection raised by the learned counsel for the appellant is answered by the learned counsel for the respondent by submitting that the contention of the tenant that the wall existed even prior to the commencement of the tenancy was not accepted by both the courts below and the concurrent finding of the lower Courts is that the construction of the wall was made on the verandah. The reason given by the tenant for construction of the wall is to prevent flow of water into the verandah. If really the tenant felt any inconvenience by reason of flow of water into the verandah, he should have given notice to the landlord requesting him to stop the flow of water and the landlord should have made arrangements for preventing the flow of water. The tenant in the absence of any written permission is not authorised to make the construction and thereby affect the light and the air to the plaintiff's inner portion.

5. The learned counsel for the appellant further argued that since the construction made by the respondent is not of permanent nature, there was no necessity to take permission from the Municipal Corporation. But there is no clear evidence that the construction in the veranda


















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