1. A batch of these forty-three petitions is proposed to be disposed of by this common order because they all raise the same legal question for consideration and answer by the Court and that question is whether the Magistrate has power under sections 451 or 457 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to grant interim release of the vehicle seized by the authorities either under the M.P. Excise Act, 1915 or under the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 or under the Forest Act.

2. I would like to note that some of these petitions have been filed by the owners of the offending vehicles aggrieved by refusal of interim release of their vehicles by the Magistrate on the ground that he has no power or jurisdiction to grant interim release and some petitions have been filed by the State of Madhya Pradesh aggrieved by the orders of the Magistrate/Revisional Court granting interim release of the offending vehicle to its owners on supurdari subject to certain conditions mentioned in the orders.

3. Whether the petitions have been filed by the vehicle owners or by the State raise only one question regarding competence of the Magistrate to grant interim release of vehicle to its owner during the pendency of trial against the claimant. The question that arises for consideration in these petitions has already been considered and answered by Full Bench of this Court in the case of Madhukar Rao v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2000 (1) JLJ 304 = 2000 (I) MPLJ 289 wherein it was held as under:

In order that the seized property may be treated as property of the State, there should be a finding by the competent Court that vehicle seized has been used for committing an offence. The property seized under section 50 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act from an alleged offender cannot become property of the State under Clause (d) of section 39 (1) unless there is a trial and a finding reached by the competent Court that the Property was used for committing an offence under the Act. Properties including vessel can be seized on accusation of commission of an offence under the Act and if the offender is available and is arrested, on proof of his guilt, the property seized from him and used in commission of the offence is liable to forfeiture to the State under section 51 (2) of the Act. Similarly every property seized and is held to have been used for committing an offence by competent Court, whether the offender is available or not for punishment, would be declared to be the property of the State by virtue of the provisions contained under section 39(1)(d) of the Act. Section 39 contained in Chapter-V is sort of a residuary provision to make all properties seized and found to be used in commission of an offence as properties of the State Government irrespective of the fact whether they are liable to forfeiture at the conclusion of the trial under sub-section (2) of section 51 of the Act. Instillation can be envisaged where the offence is proved to have been committed but the owner of the property or the offender himself is not available for prosecution. In that situation by virtue of Clause (d) of section 39 of the Act the property would become the property of the State without any requirement of passing an order of forfeiture in a trial by the Criminal Court in accordance with sub-section (2) of section 51 of the Act. Any property including vehicle seized on accusation or suspicion of commission of an offence under the Act can, on relevant grounds and circumstances, be released by the Magistrate pending trial in accordance with section 50 (4) read with section 451 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Mere seizure of any property including vehicle on the charge of commission of an offence would not make the property to be of the State Government under section 39 (1) (d) of Act.

4. The above view on the point in issue taken by the Full Bench of this Court in the aforementioned case has been affirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in an appeal preferred