Dr. T.N. Singh, J.-1. What minimum price human life should fetch in today's money-market in this country?

2. In the context of jurisprudence of compensation for motor accidents, Krishna Iyer, J., speaking for the Court in Concord of India Insurance Co. AIR 1979 SC 1666, expressed vocally judicial concern for denial of social justice to the citizens of this country, hoping perhaps that no more they would be weighed like slaves. Thus he spoke: "................determination of the question must be liberal, not niggardly since law values life and limbs in this free country in generous scales".

3. I think, Legislature has responded for the judicial concern adequately, enacting section 92-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, for short, the 'Act'. When any human-being perishes in a motor accident, DO matter how old he was, or what his station in life was, his legal representatives are to be paid atonce a sum of Rs.15,000/- and not a paisa less than that. I quote relevant portion of section 92-A :

"92-A. Liability to pay compensation in certain cases on the principle of no fault-(1)

(2) The amount of compensation which shall be payable under sub-section (1) in respect of death of any person shall be a fixed sum of fifteen thousand rupees and the amount of compensation payable under that sub-section in respect of permanent disablement of any person shall be a them sum of seven thousand five hundred rupees".

4. In the instant case, the accident took place several years ago, in the year 1976, when section 92-A Was not even in the contemplation of the Legislature. Therefore, Shri Dubey, who appellants for the respondents, is right in submitting that the provision cannot be given retrospective effect and would not also apply otherwise to the instant lis litigated under section 110-A of the Act. Indeed, the question is, whether any amount, less than Rs.15,000/-, can be awarded for loss of human life? I have no doubt that it has ceased to be a question of Rupaye or Paise as it used to be the law before enactment of section 92 A. Although the Court cannot, in terms, enforce section 92-A, there is a Constitutional as also statutory duty on the Court to abide by the guidelines provided therein to award "just" compensation under Sec. 110-B in a claim preferred under section 110-A of the Act.

5. Section 110.D provides for appeal by any person aggrieved by any award made by claims Tribunal under section 110-B and according to the provisions of 110•C (2) in dealing with a claim made under section 110-A of the Act the appellate Court, like the Claims Tribunal, is competent to follow mutatus mutandis the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. Indeed, power of the Claims Tribunal and of this Court in appeal to devise its own procedure flows from section 1l0•C (1) which imparts sui generis character to the power. This view I took in Shahzad Khan 1986 (1) MPWN 28 would, therefore, hold it permissible to look immediately into rule 33 of order 41, C.P.C. which imposed a duty on the appellate Court, while conferring power thereunder to mould relief to suit circumstances obtaining on the date when the appeal is disposed of. Such circumstances, in my opinion, would also be changed in law affecting parties' right or conferment on any Court of any new power to deal with any pending matter in a particular way. This view I take on the authority of Kanhaiya Ram AIR 1985 SC 371.

6. I also feel disposed to enforce the Constitutional imperative underwritten in Article 39-A of the Constitution by which is constitutionally ordained such legal system in this country as would promote social justice. Where the aged parents would find justice if Courts of law judicial "Hits do not issue to provide just recompense for their persona] loss which is irreparable? If poor parents suffer or tend to suffer a vacant future due to loss of their child whose company or support they can look to in old age, would they not stand deprived of social Justice? Such judicial writs unfortun