T.N. Singh, J.-1. Absence of boggling authorities was not considered a handicap in rendering the decision in Chandrashekhar v Krishnadas 1986 (II) MPWN 190 To-day I am inclined to consider it a blessing-the pains taking enterprise of respondents counsel who has laboured hard with the aid of case-law, in persuading me to have a second look at Chandrashekhar.

2. First few skeletal facts, necessary to dispose of the contentions agitated. The defendant is the appellant against whom the suit was instituted on 20-10-1973 under section 12 (1) (a) of the Madhya pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961, for short, the 'Act' or M.P. Act. Two Courts below having passed decrees for his eviction from the suit house, she bas appealed to this Court, indeed pinning hopes on Chandrashekhar (supra). The admitted position is that on 1-3-1974, in his written statement, the appellant ‘disputed’ the 'arrears of the rent' for non-payment of which the suit was instituted On 10-10-1974, the trial Court resolved the 'dispute' and determined the 'arrears' due payable by the tenant/defendant. It has also been established that pursuant to the said determination, within a month of the order, the tenant/defendant deposited in Court the 'disputes' and she has further continued to deposit regularly in Court the rent due payable by him for the suit house. Indeed, this position appears clear from I. A. No.789 of 1986 filed in this Court on 12-2-1986 and respondents reply there to filed on 6-12-1986. In the reply, the only contention agitated is that there is no explanation in the said application made in this Court after 12/13 years ‘to condone the belated payments', concerning the period between 11-11-1973 to 10-10-1974. That this contention bas no factual basis is evident from facts earlier adverted that the belated payment was due to no fault of the tenant-defendant, but due to delay occurred in determination by the Court of the 'arrears' in order to resolve the 'dispute' which was raised in the written statement itself as early as on 1-3-1974.

3. Let Chandrashekhar (supra) be first revisited to appreciate the contentions agitated by respondent's counsel Shri Mangal. The decision in Chandrashekhar (supra) on the interpretation of Sections 12 (1) (a) and subsections (1) and (5) of Section 13 of the Act has indubitably projected the following legal position:

(i) The provisions aforesaid are to be read conjointly. Such an exercise manitests that it would be always landlord's burden, from the institution of the suit till he gets recovery of possession of the accommodation’ sued for, to prove that tenant's default in payment of 'the whole of the arrears of the rent legally recoverable from him' was deliberate and that it continued unabated till the Executing Court passed 'order' for his eviction in the execution 'proceeding' persued on the strength of decree of eviction passed against the tenant.

(ii) It would be within the jurisdiction of the appellate Court whether suo motu or on application of the tenant, to pass any order during the pendency of the appeal or, when the appeal is disposed of, making appropriate direction allowing the tenant to make payment 'of the whole of the arrears of rent' due payable on the date of such an order, by a date fixed by it and in the manner directed by it.

(iii) The ultimate jurisdiction to pass an 'order' in favour of the landlord 'for recovery of possession of the accommodation by him evidently vests in the Executing Court. It would be competent, therefore, for the appellate Court to make an order allowing the tenant to make deposit in the Executing Court 'of the whole of the arrears of the rent' due payable by him on the date of the order and on such deposit being made, it shall be within the competence of the Executing Court to record satisfaction of the decree and to refuse to pass an order allowing execution of the decree passed for tenant's eviction. This is clearly under written in the language of Section 13 (5) whic