The venue of the trial is primarily determined by the allegations in the complaint, and the Court has jurisdiction based on the location of the alleged acts of cruelty and harassment.

Judgment

Arguments heard.

2. This common order shall govern disposal of both the petitions filed by the petitioners for getting the criminal proceedings, pending as Complaint Case No. 1923/2009, before Shri Sanjay Singh, JMFC, Jabalpur, quashed, under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as 'the Code'). In that case, cognizance of offences punishable under Sections 498-A read with Section 34 of the IPC and Section 3 read with Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 has been taken upon a complaint filed by Shilpi Mehrotra, impleaded as respondent No. 1 in both the cases.

3. Marriage of the complainant/respondent No. 1 was solemnised with Pankaj, who is the son of Kedarnath and Mohani and brother of Ruchi, on 9-2-2007 at Kota (Rajasthan).

4. The complaint inter alia contained the following allegations :-

(i) Soon after the marriage, the petitioners started subjecting the complainant to cruelty and harassment for not bringing sufficient dowry and on 1-3-2007, upon her return to parental home at Jabalpur, she apprised her parents of the mal-treatment at the hands of the petitioners for non-fulfillment of their expectation for dowry worth Rs. 25-30 lacs.

(ii) On 30-4-2007, parents of the complainant took her to the matrimonial home at Kota where Pankaj, Kedarnath and Mohani impressed upon them to purchase a flat for them in Mumbai or any other Metropolitan City. Still, she was made to stay there under the hope for improvement in behavioral pattern of her husband and in-laws.

(iii) Ultimately, on 30-5-2007, Pankaj and Kedarnath left the complainant at her parental home in Jabalpur, saying that she will be taken back only upon satisfaction of the demand for a flat. Thereafter, Mohani and Ruchi also reiterated telephonically the same pre-condition for her re-entry to the matrimonial home.

5. The complaint was forwarded, under Section 156 (3) of the Code, to police for investigation and upon the corresponding report; the complaint was rejected for want of territorial jurisdiction. However, by way of order dated 5-2-2009, learned Magistrate proceeded to reconsider the question of jurisdiction in the light of the decision of the Apex Court in Sujata Mukherjee Vs. Prashant Kumar Mukherjee. (1997) 5 SCC 30, [that had already been distinguished on facts in a subsequent judgment rendered in Y. Abraham Ajith Vs. Inspector of Police, Chennai, (2004) 8 SCC 100], completely ignoring the bar of review as contained in Section 362 of the Code and directed issuance of process against the petitioners in respect of the aforesaid offences.

6. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has strenuously contended that the Court at Jabalpur had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offences as none of the alleged acts of cruelty and harassment was committed within its territory. According to him, the complainant had resided at her matrimonial home at Kota initially, for a period of 19 days and thereafter, for 29 days.

7. In response, learned Counsel for respondent No. 1, while placing reliance on Sujata Mukherjee's case (supra), has submitted that the complaint was entertainable at Jabalpur in view of the allegations suggesting that on 30-5-2007, while leaving the complainant at Jabalpur, Pankaj and Kedarnath had again put a condition for fulfillment of demand for a flat as a pre-condition for taking her back to the matrimonial home. However, in that case, the distinguishing feature was that though the dowry demands were made earlier, husband of the complainant went to the place where she was residing and had also assaulted her. Moreover, as explained by the Apex Court in Y. Abraham Ajith's case (supra) and reiterated in Ramesh Vs. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 2005 SC 1989 and Manish Ratan Vs. State of M.P., (2007) 1 SCC 262, the offence punishable under Section 498-A of the IPC is not a continuing offence. As further observed in Manish Ratan's case (supra), the term "ordinarily" has to be considered having regard to the provisions u