The main legal point established in the judgment is that the appellant's claim of property rights based on the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937 and the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 was not valid.

The appellant has filed this appeal being aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 2-4-1996 passed by the District Judge, Panna in Civil Appeal No. 19-A/86 affirming and confirming the judgment and decree dated 24-10-1986 passed by the Civil Judge Class-I, Panna in Civil Suit No. 1-A/79-85 thereby dismissing the suit of the appellant claiming a decree for declaration as owner in possession of house No. 53/6 situated in Mohalla Raniganj, Panna as well as for a permanent injunction prohibiting the respondents from demolishing the wall of his house.

2. The brief facts, leading to the filing of the present appeal, are that the house in question initially belonged to Gokul Prasad who had two sons, Narmada Prasad and the original respondent Kanhaiyalal @ Kandhai. The original plaintiff Gulab Dulaiya was the wife of Narmada Prasad who died on 15-3-1949. The suit was filed by the original plaintiff Gulab Dulaiya on 26-6-1979 alleging that she was in possession of and is residing in House No. 53/6, Mohalla Raniganj, Panna since the death of her husband but when she approached the local Municipal Authorities for sanction of the map as well as for a water connection in the year 1979, she came to know that the house was recorded in the name of the original defendant Kanhaiyalal pursuant to which she raised an objection on which a notice was issued to Kanhaiyalal and thereafter the Municipal Authorities dropped the proceedings by permitting the plaintiff to get her rights decided by the competent Civil Court.

It was alleged that subsequent to the aforesaid decision of the Municipal Council, Gulab Dulaiya issued a notice to the original defendant Kanhaiyalal on 3-4-1979 which was replied to on 16-5-1979 denying the claim of Gulab Dulaiya which led to filing of the suit on 26-6-1979.

The claim of the original plaintiff Gulab Dulaiya was based on the contention that the property of late Gokul Prasad, who had two sons, her late husband Narmada Prasad and Kanhaiyalal, was divided between them through a regular partition and House No. 53/6 fell in the share of Narmada Prasad. It was contended that since the very beginning Gulab Dulaiya was residing in House No. 53/6 Mohalla Raniganj, Panna and continued to do so even after the death of her husband Narmada Prasad on 5-3-1949. It was alleged that the original defendant Kanhaiyalal tried to break an opening in the partition wall between the two properties and install a door/window in the same which led to a dispute between the parties and filing of the suit on 26-6-1979. The suit was vehemently opposed by Kanhaiyalal who alleged that Gulab Dulaiya had become unchaste during the life time of Narmada Prasad and continued to remain so even after his death as a result of which one son Jagdish, the present appellant, was born in 1957 and on that count Gulab Dulaiya had been thrown out of the house after the death of Narmada Prasad and had lost all rights in the property and that Kanhaiyalal had become the sole owner.

The present appellant is the son born to Gulab Dulaiya in the year 1957 who was brought on record as the legal representatives on the strength of a Will executed by Gulab Dulaiya. The present respondent Nos. l(a) to (g) are the legal representatives of the original defendant Kanhaiyalal who died during the pendency of the appeal.

The suit, as filed by Gulab Dulaiya, was initially dismissed on 11-7-1983 against which an appeal was filed by her and by judgment dated 23-12-1985 the matter was remanded back to the trial Court. Pursuant to the remand, the suit was again decided and dismissed by judgment and decree dated 24-10-1986 and the First Appeal, filed against the said judgment and decree, has also been dismissed by the impugned judgment dated 2-4-1996, being aggrieved by which the appellant has filed the present appeal before this Court.

3. This Second Appeal was admitted by this Court on the following substantial questions of law :-

"1. Whether on the facts and in the circumstances